Caspian pipeline geopolitics : Competition between Western and Northern oil and gas transport routes to Europe

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F19%3A00111950" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/19:00111950 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2019/journal_eng/cac-04/07.shtml" target="_blank" >https://www.ca-c.org/journal/2019/journal_eng/cac-04/07.shtml</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Caspian pipeline geopolitics : Competition between Western and Northern oil and gas transport routes to Europe

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Since ancient times, the Caspian region has been known for its energy resources, which attracted the attention of the leading world players. The struggle for control over hydrocarbon resources intensified after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The new independent states—Azerbai-jan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan were rich in energy resources, but economically weak, and became a target for Russia and the Western countries, which used their oil and gas companies to seek control over the hydrocarbon reserves of the new states and influence the oil and gas sectors of the economies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The second stage of the competition was the struggle for control over oil and gas export routes from the Caspian region to world markets. The fact is that initially the newly independent states had no other way to transport hydrocarbons, except to the north—through Russian territory. These pipelines were inherited from the Soviet Union; there were simply no others available at the beginning of the 1990s. Having thus become heavily dependent on Moscow, the new Caspian region states began to work on creating alternative routes, one of which was the western route—from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and then to Europe. In 1998-2018, two oil pipelines and one gas pipeline were built in the western direction, which were subsequently expanded and modernized in order to increase capacity. As a result, a feud broke out between the two main routes for delivering Caspian oil and gas to Europe and to world markets: the northern and western routes. The northern route is being lobbied by Russia, the western—by the U.S., EU, and Turkey. Accordingly, depending on geopolitical preferences and the degree of dependence on one or another world locus of power, supporters of the northern and western routes were identified among the new countries of the Caspian. Thus, Azerbaijan has clearly come to support the western route, Kazakhstan—the northern one, and Turkmenistan has not yet made its decision, preferring to export gas along the northern route, and oil—along the western one. This article compares the strengths and weaknesses of both routes and the influence of geopolitics on the choices made by Baku, Nur-Sultan, and Ashghabad for exporting their hydrocarbons to Europe.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Caspian pipeline geopolitics : Competition between Western and Northern oil and gas transport routes to Europe

Popis výsledku anglicky

Since ancient times, the Caspian region has been known for its energy resources, which attracted the attention of the leading world players. The struggle for control over hydrocarbon resources intensified after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The new independent states—Azerbai-jan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan were rich in energy resources, but economically weak, and became a target for Russia and the Western countries, which used their oil and gas companies to seek control over the hydrocarbon reserves of the new states and influence the oil and gas sectors of the economies of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The second stage of the competition was the struggle for control over oil and gas export routes from the Caspian region to world markets. The fact is that initially the newly independent states had no other way to transport hydrocarbons, except to the north—through Russian territory. These pipelines were inherited from the Soviet Union; there were simply no others available at the beginning of the 1990s. Having thus become heavily dependent on Moscow, the new Caspian region states began to work on creating alternative routes, one of which was the western route—from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and then to Europe. In 1998-2018, two oil pipelines and one gas pipeline were built in the western direction, which were subsequently expanded and modernized in order to increase capacity. As a result, a feud broke out between the two main routes for delivering Caspian oil and gas to Europe and to world markets: the northern and western routes. The northern route is being lobbied by Russia, the western—by the U.S., EU, and Turkey. Accordingly, depending on geopolitical preferences and the degree of dependence on one or another world locus of power, supporters of the northern and western routes were identified among the new countries of the Caspian. Thus, Azerbaijan has clearly come to support the western route, Kazakhstan—the northern one, and Turkmenistan has not yet made its decision, preferring to export gas along the northern route, and oil—along the western one. This article compares the strengths and weaknesses of both routes and the influence of geopolitics on the choices made by Baku, Nur-Sultan, and Ashghabad for exporting their hydrocarbons to Europe.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Central Asia and the Caucasus

ISSN

1404-6091

e-ISSN

1404-6091

Svazek periodika

20

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

SE - Švédské království

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

70-81

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85076881719