Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F23%3A00132662" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/23:00132662 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/pce-2023-0032" target="_blank" >https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/pce-2023-0032</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0032" target="_blank" >10.2478/pce-2023-0032</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non‑cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared
Popis výsledku anglicky
This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non‑cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>SC</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50601 - Political science
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/LX22NPO5101" target="_blank" >LX22NPO5101: Národní institut pro výzkum socioekonomických dopadů nemocí a systémových rizik</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2023
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Politics in Central Europe
ISSN
1801-3422
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
19
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
4
Stát vydavatele periodika
PL - Polská republika
Počet stran výsledku
30
Strana od-do
695-724
Kód UT WoS článku
—
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85180572583