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Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14230%2F23%3A00132662" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14230/23:00132662 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/pce-2023-0032" target="_blank" >https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/pce-2023-0032</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0032" target="_blank" >10.2478/pce-2023-0032</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non‑cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Opportunities and Limits of Presidential Activism : Czech presidents compared

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    This article analyses the use of powers by Czech presidents Václav Havel (1993–2003), Václav Klaus (2003–2013) and Miloš Zeman (2013–2023). The text is based on the concept of presidential activism, empirically examining mainly their interactions with governments and legislative vetoes. The results show that important incentives for presidential activism are non‑cohesive coalition governments, minority governments, slim government majorities in parliament, the collapse of governments and a chaotic parliament. On the other hand, the internal cohesion of a government acts as a constraint on presidential activism. Popularly elected Zeman interpreted his powers much more widely in appointing and removing governments and ministers than Havel or Klaus, who were elected by parliament. By contrast, Zeman used his legislative powers less than his two predecessors, which was apparently influenced by their low success (with some exceptions) in this area. The president’s political proximity to the government was found to only sometimes limit his agility. Czech presidents have rarely been passive. A specific factor that affected activism was the poor health of Havel and Zeman at certain moments. To reduce systemic risks in the future, it would be useful to define more precisely the rules for appointing and dismissing a government and individual ministers.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    J<sub>SC</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    50601 - Political science

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

    <a href="/cs/project/LX22NPO5101" target="_blank" >LX22NPO5101: Národní institut pro výzkum socioekonomických dopadů nemocí a systémových rizik</a><br>

  • Návaznosti

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2023

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název periodika

    Politics in Central Europe

  • ISSN

    1801-3422

  • e-ISSN

  • Svazek periodika

    19

  • Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

    4

  • Stát vydavatele periodika

    PL - Polská republika

  • Počet stran výsledku

    30

  • Strana od-do

    695-724

  • Kód UT WoS článku

  • EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

    2-s2.0-85180572583