Postcards from the Post-HTTP World: Amplification of HTTPS Vulnerabilities in the Web Ecosystem

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F19%3A00107250" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/19:00107250 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/sp/2019/666000a948/19skg7hRywM" target="_blank" >https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/sp/2019/666000a948/19skg7hRywM</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00053" target="_blank" >10.1109/SP.2019.00053</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Postcards from the Post-HTTP World: Amplification of HTTPS Vulnerabilities in the Web Ecosystem

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

HTTPS aims at securing communication over the Web by providing a cryptographic protection layer that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of communication and enables client/server authentication. However, HTTPS is based on the SSL/TLS protocol suites that have been shown to be vulnerable to various attacks in the years. This has required fixes and mitigations both in the servers and in the browsers, producing a complicated mixture of protocol versions and implementations in the wild, which makes it unclear which attacks are still effective on the modern Web and what is their import on web application security. In this paper, we present the first systematic quantitative evaluation of web application insecurity due to cryptographic vulnerabilities. We specify attack conditions against TLS using attack trees and we crawl the Alexa Top 10k to assess the import of these issues on page integrity, authentication credentials and web tracking. Our results show that the security of a consistent number of websites is severely harmed by cryptographic weaknesses that, in many cases, are due to external or related-domain hosts. This empirically, yet systematically demonstrates how a relatively limited number of exploitable HTTPS vulnerabilities are amplified by the complexity of the web ecosystem.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Postcards from the Post-HTTP World: Amplification of HTTPS Vulnerabilities in the Web Ecosystem

Popis výsledku anglicky

HTTPS aims at securing communication over the Web by providing a cryptographic protection layer that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of communication and enables client/server authentication. However, HTTPS is based on the SSL/TLS protocol suites that have been shown to be vulnerable to various attacks in the years. This has required fixes and mitigations both in the servers and in the browsers, producing a complicated mixture of protocol versions and implementations in the wild, which makes it unclear which attacks are still effective on the modern Web and what is their import on web application security. In this paper, we present the first systematic quantitative evaluation of web application insecurity due to cryptographic vulnerabilities. We specify attack conditions against TLS using attack trees and we crawl the Alexa Top 10k to assess the import of these issues on page integrity, authentication credentials and web tracking. Our results show that the security of a consistent number of websites is severely harmed by cryptographic weaknesses that, in many cases, are due to external or related-domain hosts. This empirically, yet systematically demonstrates how a relatively limited number of exploitable HTTPS vulnerabilities are amplified by the complexity of the web ecosystem.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA16-08565S" target="_blank" >GA16-08565S: Rozvoj kryptoanalytických metod prostřednictvím evolučních výpočtů</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 40th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

ISBN

9781538666609

ISSN

1081-6011

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

281-298

Název nakladatele

IEEE

Místo vydání

San Fransisco, CA, US

Místo konání akce

San Francisco, CA

Datum konání akce

20. 5. 2019

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000510006100017