Large-scale randomness study of security margins for 100+ cryptographic functions
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F22%3A00126488" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/22:00126488 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0011267600003283" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0011267600003283</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0011267600003283" target="_blank" >10.5220/0011267600003283</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Large-scale randomness study of security margins for 100+ cryptographic functions
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The output of cryptographic functions, be it encryption routines or hash functions, should be statistically indistinguishable from a truly random data for an external observer. The property can be partially tested automatically using batteries of statistical tests. However, it is not easy in practice: multiple incompatible test suites exist, with possibly overlapping and correlated tests, making the statistically robust interpretation of results difficult. Additionally, a significant amount of data processing is required to test every separate cryptographic function. Due to these obstacles, no large-scale systematic analysis of the the round-reduced cryptographic functions w.r.t their input mixing capability, which would provide an insight into the behaviour of the whole classes of functions rather than few selected ones, was yet published. We created a framework to consistently run 414 statistical tests and their variants from the commonly used statistical testing batteries (NIST STS, Dieharder, TestU01, and BoolTest). Using the distributed computational cluster providing required significant processing power, we analyzed the output of 109 round-reduced cryptographic functions (hash, lightweight, and block-based encryption functions) in the multiple configurations, scrutinizing the mixing property of each one. As a result, we established the fraction of a function’s rounds with still detectable bias (a.k.a. security margin) when analyzed by randomness statistical tests.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Large-scale randomness study of security margins for 100+ cryptographic functions
Popis výsledku anglicky
The output of cryptographic functions, be it encryption routines or hash functions, should be statistically indistinguishable from a truly random data for an external observer. The property can be partially tested automatically using batteries of statistical tests. However, it is not easy in practice: multiple incompatible test suites exist, with possibly overlapping and correlated tests, making the statistically robust interpretation of results difficult. Additionally, a significant amount of data processing is required to test every separate cryptographic function. Due to these obstacles, no large-scale systematic analysis of the the round-reduced cryptographic functions w.r.t their input mixing capability, which would provide an insight into the behaviour of the whole classes of functions rather than few selected ones, was yet published. We created a framework to consistently run 414 statistical tests and their variants from the commonly used statistical testing batteries (NIST STS, Dieharder, TestU01, and BoolTest). Using the distributed computational cluster providing required significant processing power, we analyzed the output of 109 round-reduced cryptographic functions (hash, lightweight, and block-based encryption functions) in the multiple configurations, scrutinizing the mixing property of each one. As a result, we established the fraction of a function’s rounds with still detectable bias (a.k.a. security margin) when analyzed by randomness statistical tests.
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
10200 - Computer and information sciences
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2022
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Security and Cryptography
ISBN
9789897585906
ISSN
2184-7711
e-ISSN
—
Počet stran výsledku
13
Strana od-do
134-146
Název nakladatele
Scitepress
Místo vydání
Lisbon, Portugal
Místo konání akce
Lisbon, Portugal
Datum konání akce
1. 1. 2022
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
WRD - Celosvětová akce
Kód UT WoS článku
000853004900011