Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14330%2F24%3A00136252" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14330/24:00136252 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10538928" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10538928</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263" target="_blank" >10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Insider attacks in organizations are currently one of the most crucial cybersecurity challenges. Traitors are one of the most dangerous types of insider attackers. They are difficult to detect because they know the organization, processes, defense mechanisms, and employees. Besides abusing their rights and accesses, they can use their co-workers’ rights and accesses. They can hide their activities to perform attacks inconspicuously. The current masquerader detection techniques usually rely on the fact that the masquerader is an outsider, making them unable to detect attacks from the traitor. To detect these insider attackers, which we call masquerading traitors, we propose the human-as-solution approach and engage the employees in deciding whether the usage of their rights and accesses is suspicious and, therefore, might be performed by a masquerading traitor.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer

Popis výsledku anglicky

Insider attacks in organizations are currently one of the most crucial cybersecurity challenges. Traitors are one of the most dangerous types of insider attackers. They are difficult to detect because they know the organization, processes, defense mechanisms, and employees. Besides abusing their rights and accesses, they can use their co-workers’ rights and accesses. They can hide their activities to perform attacks inconspicuously. The current masquerader detection techniques usually rely on the fact that the masquerader is an outsider, making them unable to detect attacks from the traitor. To detect these insider attackers, which we call masquerading traitors, we propose the human-as-solution approach and engage the employees in deciding whether the usage of their rights and accesses is suspicious and, therefore, might be performed by a masquerading traitor.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

2023 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)

ISBN

9798350382006

ISSN

2324-898X

e-ISSN

2324-9013

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

1935-1940

Název nakladatele

IEEE

Místo vydání

Neuveden

Místo konání akce

Exeter, United Kingdom

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2023

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

001239879400239