Independence and Responsibility of Central Banks

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F05%3A00031200" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/05:00031200 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Independence and Responsibility of Central Banks

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A strong information asymmetry may exist between central bank managers and both the public and the government. Therefore managerial discretion of the central bank managers is possible. On the other hand the government is able to constrain, or threaten itbetter than anyone else. For this reason the central bank can neither be fully controlled by the government, nor fully independent of it. The actual level of independence may differ from the formal one, and may not be observable. There can also be manyspecial-interest groups in the economy that can try either to bribe or threaten the central bank managers. The strength and aims of these groups may change through the time. For this reason the generally optimal level of the central bank formal independence might not exist.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Independence and Responsibility of Central Banks

Popis výsledku anglicky

A strong information asymmetry may exist between central bank managers and both the public and the government. Therefore managerial discretion of the central bank managers is possible. On the other hand the government is able to constrain, or threaten itbetter than anyone else. For this reason the central bank can neither be fully controlled by the government, nor fully independent of it. The actual level of independence may differ from the formal one, and may not be observable. There can also be manyspecial-interest groups in the economy that can try either to bribe or threaten the central bank managers. The strength and aims of these groups may change through the time. For this reason the generally optimal level of the central bank formal independence might not exist.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2005

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

New Perspectives on Political Economy

ISSN

1801-0938

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

1

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

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Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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