Agent-based Computational Model of Democratic Choice of Redistribution under Almost Perfect Human Mobility

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Agent-based Computational Model of Democratic Choice of Redistribution under Almost Perfect Human Mobility

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper shows by means of an agent-based simulation that people's ability to relocate from one region to another creates no tax competition among the regions if the taxes and transfers are set democratically. We can observe three types of behavior: 1)if the cost of relocation is high, no one relocates and the original level of redistributions is sustained; 2) if the cost is low, the system has no steady state---the more productive people run away from redistribution and the less productive ones pursue them forever; 3) if the cost is medium, usually only the more productive people relocate---the tax rates usually fall and converge (but not always). If they do, it is because the populations are more homogenous after the relocation, not because of taxcompetitions---there is none.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Agent-based Computational Model of Democratic Choice of Redistribution under Almost Perfect Human Mobility

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper shows by means of an agent-based simulation that people's ability to relocate from one region to another creates no tax competition among the regions if the taxes and transfers are set democratically. We can observe three types of behavior: 1)if the cost of relocation is high, no one relocates and the original level of redistributions is sustained; 2) if the cost is low, the system has no steady state---the more productive people run away from redistribution and the less productive ones pursue them forever; 3) if the cost is medium, usually only the more productive people relocate---the tax rates usually fall and converge (but not always). If they do, it is because the populations are more homogenous after the relocation, not because of taxcompetitions---there is none.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2010

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010

ISBN

9788073942182

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

7

Strana od-do

392-398

Název nakladatele

University of South Bohemia in České Budějovice

Místo vydání

České Budějovice

Místo konání akce

České Budějovice

Datum konání akce

8. 9. 2010

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000287979900067