The SGP - faulty by design or made faulty by politicians? An assessment based on simulation model.

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F13%3A00069663" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/13:00069663 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://mme2013.vspj.cz/about-conference/conference-proceedings" target="_blank" >https://mme2013.vspj.cz/about-conference/conference-proceedings</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The SGP - faulty by design or made faulty by politicians? An assessment based on simulation model.

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

By joining the European Monetary Union (the ?EMU?) member countries lost the ability to use the monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic regulation. The attention was than focused on the regulation of the fiscal policy and the agreed instrument was theStability and Growth Pact (the "SGP"). States of the EMU have agreed to satisfy the 3% of GDP for the maximum annual public budgets deficit. Based on the evolution of the public debt in member countries we can say that the SGP has failed as a tool of fiscal discipline. In this paper we answer the question whether the failure was given due to incorrect concept of the SGP or whether the development of the debt was affected more by arbitrary disrespect of agreed rules. The two reasons mentioned above areinterdependent. To separate them, we construct a dynamic model of EU countries public debt. By using real data we simulate the potential values of public debt in a situation where the SGP rules had been respected in recent years.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The SGP - faulty by design or made faulty by politicians? An assessment based on simulation model.

Popis výsledku anglicky

By joining the European Monetary Union (the ?EMU?) member countries lost the ability to use the monetary policy as a tool of macroeconomic regulation. The attention was than focused on the regulation of the fiscal policy and the agreed instrument was theStability and Growth Pact (the "SGP"). States of the EMU have agreed to satisfy the 3% of GDP for the maximum annual public budgets deficit. Based on the evolution of the public debt in member countries we can say that the SGP has failed as a tool of fiscal discipline. In this paper we answer the question whether the failure was given due to incorrect concept of the SGP or whether the development of the debt was affected more by arbitrary disrespect of agreed rules. The two reasons mentioned above areinterdependent. To separate them, we construct a dynamic model of EU countries public debt. By using real data we simulate the potential values of public debt in a situation where the SGP rules had been respected in recent years.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 31st International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics 2013

ISBN

9788087035764

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

279-284

Název nakladatele

College of Polytechnics Jihlava

Místo vydání

Jihlava

Místo konání akce

Jihlava

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2013

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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