Can Experimental and Behavioral Economics Inform Public Policy? Lesson from a Tax Compliance Experiment

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F14%3A00076352" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/14:00076352 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Can Experimental and Behavioral Economics Inform Public Policy? Lesson from a Tax Compliance Experiment

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

During last two decades, experimental and behavioral economics have become one of the most flourishing parts of economics. Their results usually indicate regularities which contradict the economic model based on homo economicus concept. The analysis introduced in this paper illustrates the possibilities and limits of the ex-perimental method?s contribution in policy making. Although there are several doubts related to the external validity of the experimental results, there is a potential of getting information on behavior of economic agents which can hardly be obtained by other method. Results of the experiment indicate that increasing probability of an audit appears to be more effective in enhancing tax compliance compared to increasing penalty rate(with constant audit rate). The control also ensured higher and more stable increase in contributions to a public good.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Can Experimental and Behavioral Economics Inform Public Policy? Lesson from a Tax Compliance Experiment

Popis výsledku anglicky

During last two decades, experimental and behavioral economics have become one of the most flourishing parts of economics. Their results usually indicate regularities which contradict the economic model based on homo economicus concept. The analysis introduced in this paper illustrates the possibilities and limits of the ex-perimental method?s contribution in policy making. Although there are several doubts related to the external validity of the experimental results, there is a potential of getting information on behavior of economic agents which can hardly be obtained by other method. Results of the experiment indicate that increasing probability of an audit appears to be more effective in enhancing tax compliance compared to increasing penalty rate(with constant audit rate). The control also ensured higher and more stable increase in contributions to a public good.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 19th International Conference Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Public Finance 2014

ISBN

9788074785344

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

28-37

Název nakladatele

Wolters Kluwer, a. s.

Místo vydání

Praha

Místo konání akce

Praha

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2014

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000348877900003