Wage-corruption trade off in a bribery experiment

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F16%3A00093300" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/16:00093300 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Wage-corruption trade off in a bribery experiment

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Theory suggest that lower wages in public administration encourage higher level of bureaucratic corruption and that wage raise may act as an anti-corruption policy. Nevertheless, the empirical studies do not find a general confirmation for theoretical suggestions. We designed and conducted a laboratory experiment in which public servants with different wages given by their superior face bribes. Our results show that not only the low-wage or high-wage do drive the bribery decision of a public servant, but also a probability and size of punishment play important role in his bribery decision-making.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Wage-corruption trade off in a bribery experiment

Popis výsledku anglicky

Theory suggest that lower wages in public administration encourage higher level of bureaucratic corruption and that wage raise may act as an anti-corruption policy. Nevertheless, the empirical studies do not find a general confirmation for theoretical suggestions. We designed and conducted a laboratory experiment in which public servants with different wages given by their superior face bribes. Our results show that not only the low-wage or high-wage do drive the bribery decision of a public servant, but also a probability and size of punishment play important role in his bribery decision-making.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů