Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F17%3A00096086" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/17:00096086 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study

Popis výsledku anglicky

As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017.

ISBN

9788021084483

ISSN

2336-1239

e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

7

Strana od-do

20-26

Název nakladatele

Masaryk University

Místo vydání

Brno

Místo konání akce

Šlapanice

Datum konání akce

19. 1. 2017

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000402427100002