Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F23%3A00134007" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/23:00134007 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10323732221109652" target="_blank" >https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10323732221109652</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10323732221109652" target="_blank" >10.1177/10323732221109652</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Communist economies of the former Eastern Bloc were driven by systems of central planning. The central plan set detailed goals to be achieved by the state-owned enterprises, which often struggled to meet them and obtain bonuses or avoid the related sanctions. In line with the principal-agent theory, we study the behaviour of managers of the Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in this specific environment and investigate the possibility of using creative accounting methods and other methods to cover failures in meeting those plans. Statistical analysis based on accounting records from the 1970s and 1980s recovered from state archives indicates that meeting the central plans targets was often achieved through false reporting. This conclusion is further supported by two series of 75 and 80 interviews with former managers of socialist state-owned enterprises. We expect our findings to hold for other centrally planned economies, as managers’ original motivations were distorted by features which were inherent to the centrally planned system itself.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism

Popis výsledku anglicky

Communist economies of the former Eastern Bloc were driven by systems of central planning. The central plan set detailed goals to be achieved by the state-owned enterprises, which often struggled to meet them and obtain bonuses or avoid the related sanctions. In line with the principal-agent theory, we study the behaviour of managers of the Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in this specific environment and investigate the possibility of using creative accounting methods and other methods to cover failures in meeting those plans. Statistical analysis based on accounting records from the 1970s and 1980s recovered from state archives indicates that meeting the central plans targets was often achieved through false reporting. This conclusion is further supported by two series of 75 and 80 interviews with former managers of socialist state-owned enterprises. We expect our findings to hold for other centrally planned economies, as managers’ original motivations were distorted by features which were inherent to the centrally planned system itself.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50205 - Accounting

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-23131S" target="_blank" >GA20-23131S: Transformace českých podniků: socialistické podniky v tržní ekonomice</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Accounting History

ISSN

1032-3732

e-ISSN

1749-3374

Svazek periodika

28

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

170-191

Kód UT WoS článku

000838277700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85135856838