Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F24%3A00139485" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/24:00139485 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Popis výsledku anglicky

We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-06785S" target="_blank" >GA20-06785S: Experimentální analýza problematiky přispívání na vícenásobné veřejné statky</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS

ISSN

0047-2727

e-ISSN

0047-2727

Svazek periodika

238

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

October

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

1-21

Kód UT WoS článku

001276381800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85199000563