The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216224%3A14560%2F25%3A00140333" target="_blank" >RIV/00216224:14560/25:00140333 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study how different types of individuals respond to being forced to make a minimum contribution to a global public good. Participants in our experiment decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards offsetting CO2 emissions. We elicit their contributions when they are free to spend any amount of their endowment on carbon offsets and when they are forced to spend a certain minimum amount on it. We find that those who contribute more than the minimum before it is imposed contribute less overall once the minimum comes into effect. This is true for both a low and a high level of the minimum and appears to be driven in part by pessimistic beliefs about the contributions of others. We show that the lower minimum also reduces overall contributions relative to a situation with no minimum. We do not find evidence that having the level of the minimum determined through a majority vote rather than an exogenous procedure has any material impact on these results.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study how different types of individuals respond to being forced to make a minimum contribution to a global public good. Participants in our experiment decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards offsetting CO2 emissions. We elicit their contributions when they are free to spend any amount of their endowment on carbon offsets and when they are forced to spend a certain minimum amount on it. We find that those who contribute more than the minimum before it is imposed contribute less overall once the minimum comes into effect. This is true for both a low and a high level of the minimum and appears to be driven in part by pessimistic beliefs about the contributions of others. We show that the lower minimum also reduces overall contributions relative to a situation with no minimum. We do not find evidence that having the level of the minimum determined through a majority vote rather than an exogenous procedure has any material impact on these results.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

ISSN

0921-8009

e-ISSN

1873-6106

Svazek periodika

227

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

January

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

1-20

Kód UT WoS článku

001308248700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85202962948