Vina, láska, náhoda

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F18%3A39913781" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/18:39913781 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

čeština

Název v původním jazyce

Vina, láska, náhoda

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Co znamená odsoudit někoho za to, co učinil? Je vůbec možné „nenávidět hřích, ale milovat hříšníka“? Otázky po významu morálního soudu, vinění a zodpovědnosti otevírají v knize rozsáhlé zkoumání vztahu člověka a jeho pomíjivého, ale zároveň nezvratného činu, v němž klíčovou úlohu hrají jednak zpětný pohled a reakce jednajícího, jednak dopad provinění na vztahy jednajícího, včetně vztahu k sobě samému. Skutečnost, že lítost a pocity viny nejsou omezeny jen na zamýšlené jednání, se v anglosaské etice posledních desetiletí stala podnětem ke zpochybňování kantovské představy, že morálně hodnotit lze výhradně to, co je v naší moci. Na tento vývoj navazuje ústřední myšlenková linie knihy zdůrazňující detailní pozornost ke konkrétní situaci jednání a psychologii jednajícího, která odhaluje, do jaké míry je lidské jednání vystaveno různým vlivům náhody. Tato změna úhlu pohledu vede k pokoře a vstřícnosti při posuzování druhých a ukazuje cestu pro smíření lásky a viny.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Guilt, Love, Luck

Popis výsledku anglicky

The central topic of the book is individual guilt understood as an immoral act for which the agent can be blamed and that becomes part of her past. Its primary aim being to do justice to the experience of wrongdoing and guilt, the book falls in the domain of moral psychology. Following the inquiry by P. Winch and B. A. O. Williams, the starting point is the unique perspective of the agent, not the observer: it is the agent who is responsible for her wrongdoing and it is her who has to live with what she has done. This emphasis brings forward two aspects of guilt that have been neglected in the past: Firstly, the longstanding character and identity of the agent that ground the continuity of her life and actions. Secondly, the agent’s relationships, including the relationship to oneself, that are significantly affected by the wrongdoing. One of the main claims of the book is that wrongdoing’s impact on an agent’s relationships and the possibilities of their recovery are inseparably connected with the conception of guilt as such. The first of the three parts of the book is dedicated to the presentation of the recent development in Anglophone ethics, in which, thanks to the revival of virtue ethics and moral psychology, the concepts of character, identity and human relationships play a key part. The presentation starts with the older, “legalistic” conception of moral action and responsibility connected mainly with Kantianism and with criticism that objects to its narrow focus on reason and control. The ensuing development rehabilitated emotional and motivational (or, more generally, “psychological”) structures of action and extended the scope of ethics even to aspects that are not fully in the agent’s control. Part of the criticism was formulated by a minor Platonic-Wittgensteinian ethical school that will be key for the leading theses of the following main parts. The key point in the investigation of guilt in the two remaining parts is the interpretation of the relation between the agent and her action as it is expressed in the classic form of moral judgment and blame: we condemn (blame) a person for her action. In Part II “Luck and Responsibility”, I show that it is wrong to understand this relation in such a way that the action is an expression of the agent’s character and therefore by condemning the action, we condemn the agent as well. Such an interpretation unduly focuses on the inner aspect of action and neglects the outer one, the fact that action is also an event in the world that affects other people. If we take seriously that the proper object of moral judgment is action (as the authors of the moral luck debate do), it becomes clear that there are many ways in which it is influenced by luck. What we do and what we are judged for is not just a straightforward application of our character dispositions. The actual course of action is the outcome of the interplay between the agent’s character and the particular situation. In Part III “Love and Guilt”, guilt and moral judgment are investigated through the way in which they affect the wrongdoer’s relationships, including her relationship to herself, such as they are grounded in love. If love is based on the appreciation of the other’s character, her guilt puts the loving attitude in question. I will contest that assumption on the basis of a traditional critique of moral assessment of others such as Augustine’s dictum that we should “hate the sin, love the sinner”. The tendency to condemn others, as in the vice of judgmentalism, is connected with a sense of one’s superiority that is incompatible with love. I will advocate the contemporary Platonists’ concept of unconditional love that does not depend on the appreciation of the other’s character but presupposes a certain virtue, that of humility, on the part of the lover. A humble person (contrary to the proud or conceited one) does not derive the value of people including herself from qualities or achievements, but sees it as inherent in all of them. That enables her to put up with the guilt of others and oneself in a way that is neither self-centred nor self-assertive.

Druh

B - Odborná kniha

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA13-14510S" target="_blank" >GA13-14510S: Filosofické koncepce lásky a přátelství v současné a starořecké filosofii</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

ISBN

978-80-7465-312-4

Počet stran knihy

296

Název nakladatele

Pavel Mervart

Místo vydání

Červený Kostelec

Kód UT WoS knihy

—