In Hindsight: An Essay Concerning My Limited Moral Understanding

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F24%3A39921003" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/24:39921003 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-023-09461-6" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10892-023-09461-6</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-023-09461-6" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10892-023-09461-6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

In Hindsight: An Essay Concerning My Limited Moral Understanding

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article explores one central assumption that is guiding large portions of contemporary (analytic) moral philosophy: the idea that moral philosophy has to be forward-looking and action-guiding. By paying attention to a number of examples, it is argued that this guiding assumption flies in the face of important aspects of actual moral life. Moral situations are not (always) of the nature that we can plan for them, and reason about them in advance. Rather, the moral reality, or the moral contexts, are often such that the moral situation is created in the scene, and hence something that is only available to reflect upon in hindsight. There are, at least, two central reasons why this is so: The first is that the sense, meaning, of the actions and the concepts we use in reflection about them, are not locked beforehand, and our understanding of them are formed in the process. The second reason is that moral situations come about in a responsive, rather than planned, way. That is, we discover our moral world by means of our reactive interactions, rather than in theoretical reflection that aims to produce &quot;&quot;anticipated beliefs.&quot;&quot; Thus, this article suggests a way of exploring morality&apos;s backward-looking nature that does not misrepresent moral reality.&quot;

Název v anglickém jazyce

In Hindsight: An Essay Concerning My Limited Moral Understanding

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article explores one central assumption that is guiding large portions of contemporary (analytic) moral philosophy: the idea that moral philosophy has to be forward-looking and action-guiding. By paying attention to a number of examples, it is argued that this guiding assumption flies in the face of important aspects of actual moral life. Moral situations are not (always) of the nature that we can plan for them, and reason about them in advance. Rather, the moral reality, or the moral contexts, are often such that the moral situation is created in the scene, and hence something that is only available to reflect upon in hindsight. There are, at least, two central reasons why this is so: The first is that the sense, meaning, of the actions and the concepts we use in reflection about them, are not locked beforehand, and our understanding of them are formed in the process. The second reason is that moral situations come about in a responsive, rather than planned, way. That is, we discover our moral world by means of our reactive interactions, rather than in theoretical reflection that aims to produce &quot;&quot;anticipated beliefs.&quot;&quot; Thus, this article suggests a way of exploring morality&apos;s backward-looking nature that does not misrepresent moral reality.&quot;

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF15_003%2F0000425" target="_blank" >EF15_003/0000425: Centrum pro etiku</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Ethics

ISSN

1382-4554

e-ISSN

1572-8609

Svazek periodika

28

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CH - Švýcarská konfederace

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

383-404

Kód UT WoS článku

001082794700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85174040477