The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25410%2F25%3A39923427" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25410/25:39923427 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531925002120" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0275531925002120</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ribaf.2025.102956</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises' implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results show that: (1) six equilibrium points exist satisfying stability criteria, including one ideal state where enterprises implement carbon reduction policies under IR supervision with the complementary force from the public, without government subsidizing. (2) Enterprises' positive policy implementation correlates closely with reduced supervision costs and increased economic costs caused by reputational losses, and the reduction in public participation costs can promote enterprises and IR to choose the positive strategy. (3) Enhanced government financial incentives and penalties can facilitate enterprises' carbon reduction implementation. This study evaluates multi-player cost-benefit trade-offs, providing evidenced references for the policy making to optimize the regulatory mechanism in China.
Název v anglickém jazyce
The effects of regulatory mechanism on enterprise carbon reduction policies
Popis výsledku anglicky
This paper aims to explore the influencing factors for the optimization of regulatory mechanisms in stimulating enterprises' implementation of carbon reduction policies, by establishing an evolutionary game model involving government, enterprises, independent regulators (IR) and the public. Results show that: (1) six equilibrium points exist satisfying stability criteria, including one ideal state where enterprises implement carbon reduction policies under IR supervision with the complementary force from the public, without government subsidizing. (2) Enterprises' positive policy implementation correlates closely with reduced supervision costs and increased economic costs caused by reputational losses, and the reduction in public participation costs can promote enterprises and IR to choose the positive strategy. (3) Enhanced government financial incentives and penalties can facilitate enterprises' carbon reduction implementation. This study evaluates multi-player cost-benefit trade-offs, providing evidenced references for the policy making to optimize the regulatory mechanism in China.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
50206 - Finance
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2025
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Research in International Business and Finance
ISSN
0275-5319
e-ISSN
1878-3384
Svazek periodika
78
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
June
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
20
Strana od-do
102956
Kód UT WoS článku
001502665800001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-105006547017