Identification of Threats and Security Risk Assessments for Recursive Internet Architecture

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26230%2F18%3APU130772" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26230/18:PU130772 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8105791/" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8105791/</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/JSYST.2017.2765178" target="_blank" >10.1109/JSYST.2017.2765178</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Identification of Threats and Security Risk Assessments for Recursive Internet Architecture

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

There are several types of attacks on communication networks such as disrupting or blocking communication, intercepting, injecting fabricated packets, accessing and modifying the information. Here, for the first time the SecRAM, a recent security risk assessment methodology, is proposed to be systematically applied in a different context, i.e., to the network systems, specifically to an emerging network architecture called recursive internetwork architecture (RINA). The security risk assessment is performed to: identify run-time threats; assess the impact and likelihood of occurrence of attacks relevant to the threats; evaluate the RINA design principles; and validate the built-in security enablers and the mitigation actions that are devised to combat such attacks. Resulting from this assessment, specific measures are proposed to further improve cyber resiliency of the RINA, in securing its layers and components. The enhancement prevails through the utilization of multilayered security controls or the increase in their strength. We show how programmable security controls can assist in tackling network attacks. For proof of concept, we demonstrate formal analysis of some of the security properties of RINA using ProVerif tool and RINA Simulator. We apply the tool to create a formal model of a network and mitigate the selected attacks. The results of this analysis are provided.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Identification of Threats and Security Risk Assessments for Recursive Internet Architecture

Popis výsledku anglicky

There are several types of attacks on communication networks such as disrupting or blocking communication, intercepting, injecting fabricated packets, accessing and modifying the information. Here, for the first time the SecRAM, a recent security risk assessment methodology, is proposed to be systematically applied in a different context, i.e., to the network systems, specifically to an emerging network architecture called recursive internetwork architecture (RINA). The security risk assessment is performed to: identify run-time threats; assess the impact and likelihood of occurrence of attacks relevant to the threats; evaluate the RINA design principles; and validate the built-in security enablers and the mitigation actions that are devised to combat such attacks. Resulting from this assessment, specific measures are proposed to further improve cyber resiliency of the RINA, in securing its layers and components. The enhancement prevails through the utilization of multilayered security controls or the increase in their strength. We show how programmable security controls can assist in tackling network attacks. For proof of concept, we demonstrate formal analysis of some of the security properties of RINA using ProVerif tool and RINA Simulator. We apply the tool to create a formal model of a network and mitigate the selected attacks. The results of this analysis are provided.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

R - Projekt Ramcoveho programu EK

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

IEEE Systems Journal

ISSN

1932-8184

e-ISSN

1937-9234

Svazek periodika

12

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

2437-2448

Kód UT WoS článku

000443049900039

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85034236121