Counting in Regexes Considered Harmful: Exposing ReDoS Vulnerability of Nonbacktracking Matchers

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216305%3A26230%2F22%3APU144712" target="_blank" >RIV/00216305:26230/22:PU144712 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/turonova" target="_blank" >https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/turonova</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Counting in Regexes Considered Harmful: Exposing ReDoS Vulnerability of Nonbacktracking Matchers

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, we study the performance characteristics of nonbacktracking regex matchers and their vulnerability against ReDoS (regular expression denial of service) attacks. We focus on their known Achilles heel, which are extended regexes that use bounded quantifiers (e.g., (ab){100}). We propose a method for generating input texts that can cause ReDoS attacks on these matchers. The method exploits the bounded repetition and uses it to force expensive simulations of the deterministic automaton for the regex. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of our and other state-of-the-art ReDoS generators on a large set of practical regexes with a comprehensive set of backtracking and nonbacktracking matchers, as well as experiments where we demonstrate ReDoS attacks on state-of-the-art real-world security applications containing SNORT with Hyperscan and the HW-accelerated regex matching engine on the NVIDIA BlueField-2 card. Our experiments show that bounded repetition is indeed a notable weakness of nonbacktracking matchers, with our generator being the only one capable of significantly increasing their running time.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Counting in Regexes Considered Harmful: Exposing ReDoS Vulnerability of Nonbacktracking Matchers

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, we study the performance characteristics of nonbacktracking regex matchers and their vulnerability against ReDoS (regular expression denial of service) attacks. We focus on their known Achilles heel, which are extended regexes that use bounded quantifiers (e.g., (ab){100}). We propose a method for generating input texts that can cause ReDoS attacks on these matchers. The method exploits the bounded repetition and uses it to force expensive simulations of the deterministic automaton for the regex. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of our and other state-of-the-art ReDoS generators on a large set of practical regexes with a comprehensive set of backtracking and nonbacktracking matchers, as well as experiments where we demonstrate ReDoS attacks on state-of-the-art real-world security applications containing SNORT with Hyperscan and the HW-accelerated regex matching engine on the NVIDIA BlueField-2 card. Our experiments show that bounded repetition is indeed a notable weakness of nonbacktracking matchers, with our generator being the only one capable of significantly increasing their running time.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 31st USENIX Security Symposium

ISBN

978-1-939133-31-1

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

4165-4182

Název nakladatele

USENIX

Místo vydání

Boston, MA

Místo konání akce

Boston

Datum konání akce

10. 8. 2022

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

000855237506015