Impact of Non-cooperative Oligopoly of the Banking System on Its Pro-cyclicality in the Czech Republic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F14%3A%230000033" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/14:#0000033 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2014-01.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2014-01.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Impact of Non-cooperative Oligopoly of the Banking System on Its Pro-cyclicality in the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Irrational behavior of banks in the form of excessive credit expansions or contractions, as appropriate, in the course of an economic cycle, together with the subsequent intoxication of bank assets, has become the subject of many controversial regulatory measures since the 1990s. The study simulates this phenomenon using the Bayesian game, which models environment of a conflict situation with incomplete information based on historical data of the past decade in the Czech Republic. The results imply that the dominant banking strategy is – irrespectively of the behavior of other players – the strategy with inadequate risk aversion, with excessive (inadequate) optimistic or pessimistic expectations, as appropriate, depending on the economic cycle stage. The reason for this behavior that contradicts the Pareto efficiency principle is the lack of information about the portfolio strategy of other players and their mutual rivalry in terms of market share increase.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Impact of Non-cooperative Oligopoly of the Banking System on Its Pro-cyclicality in the Czech Republic

Popis výsledku anglicky

Irrational behavior of banks in the form of excessive credit expansions or contractions, as appropriate, in the course of an economic cycle, together with the subsequent intoxication of bank assets, has become the subject of many controversial regulatory measures since the 1990s. The study simulates this phenomenon using the Bayesian game, which models environment of a conflict situation with incomplete information based on historical data of the past decade in the Czech Republic. The results imply that the dominant banking strategy is – irrespectively of the behavior of other players – the strategy with inadequate risk aversion, with excessive (inadequate) optimistic or pessimistic expectations, as appropriate, depending on the economic cycle stage. The reason for this behavior that contradicts the Pareto efficiency principle is the lack of information about the portfolio strategy of other players and their mutual rivalry in terms of market share increase.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta VŠFS

ISSN

1802-792X

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

8

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

47-63

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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