Productive of the service sector: theory and practice of corruption declining

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F04274644%3A_____%2F19%3A%230000547" target="_blank" >RIV/04274644:_____/19:#0000547 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://mmi.fem.sumdu.edu.ua/en/journals/2019/4/269-279" target="_blank" >http://mmi.fem.sumdu.edu.ua/en/journals/2019/4/269-279</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21" target="_blank" >10.21272/mmi.2019.4-21</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Productive of the service sector: theory and practice of corruption declining

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Corruption contracts are, throughout the democratic world, illegal and considered immoral. Their participants thus cannot use standard procedures to find a second party, to negotiate the content of the contract, to check if it performs what was promised, and to enforce the promises. This increases the risks associated with the contract. Illegality or immorality of the contract makes both parties more vulnerable – each party can threaten to reveal the contract and denounce the second party. Connecting a corruption contract with a previously established legal contract is usually seen as the best way to reduce risks and to reinforce the corruption contract. Owing to legal contacts and contracts, potential parties interested in corruption know where they should seek a counterparty and what to offer. At the same time, the corruption contract is tied to legal contracts, and failure to fulfil conditions of the corruption contract may put such legal contract at risk, therefore there is a higher probability that both parties to the corruption contract would fulfil what was promised and that there will be no extortion by any of the parties to demand additional fulfilment after the end of the corruption contract or that the corruption contract will not be disclosed. This paper presents the opposite approach in which a corruption contract is established as the first and it creates the base for further often legal but immoral contracts. All contracts lead to the mutually advantageous affinity of all its participants who often become members of corruption networks. The article presents the model when a blackmailed or dependent person must participate in corruption contracts, otherwise, it faces serious problems. But sooner or later, participation will begin to bring him benefits, so he becomes dependent on the network, although initially, he had moral inhibitions to participate in its activities. The subjects looking a counterparty of the corruption contract thus often create the environment of dependency and blackmailing and when people that are obliged to corruption lose their scruples and they see corruption as the common behaviour. Our model comes from real corruption networks in the Czech Republic. Some of them are briefly analysed. Theory of corruption must pay higher attention to all factors contributing to the spread of corruption behaviour, including mutual dependence and extortion.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Productive of the service sector: theory and practice of corruption declining

Popis výsledku anglicky

Corruption contracts are, throughout the democratic world, illegal and considered immoral. Their participants thus cannot use standard procedures to find a second party, to negotiate the content of the contract, to check if it performs what was promised, and to enforce the promises. This increases the risks associated with the contract. Illegality or immorality of the contract makes both parties more vulnerable – each party can threaten to reveal the contract and denounce the second party. Connecting a corruption contract with a previously established legal contract is usually seen as the best way to reduce risks and to reinforce the corruption contract. Owing to legal contacts and contracts, potential parties interested in corruption know where they should seek a counterparty and what to offer. At the same time, the corruption contract is tied to legal contracts, and failure to fulfil conditions of the corruption contract may put such legal contract at risk, therefore there is a higher probability that both parties to the corruption contract would fulfil what was promised and that there will be no extortion by any of the parties to demand additional fulfilment after the end of the corruption contract or that the corruption contract will not be disclosed. This paper presents the opposite approach in which a corruption contract is established as the first and it creates the base for further often legal but immoral contracts. All contracts lead to the mutually advantageous affinity of all its participants who often become members of corruption networks. The article presents the model when a blackmailed or dependent person must participate in corruption contracts, otherwise, it faces serious problems. But sooner or later, participation will begin to bring him benefits, so he becomes dependent on the network, although initially, he had moral inhibitions to participate in its activities. The subjects looking a counterparty of the corruption contract thus often create the environment of dependency and blackmailing and when people that are obliged to corruption lose their scruples and they see corruption as the common behaviour. Our model comes from real corruption networks in the Czech Republic. Some of them are briefly analysed. Theory of corruption must pay higher attention to all factors contributing to the spread of corruption behaviour, including mutual dependence and extortion.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Marketing and Management of Innovations

ISSN

2227-6718

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

9

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

UA - Ukrajina

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

269-279

Kód UT WoS článku

000504921700021

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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