Persuasion with simplistic worldviews

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F25840886%3A_____%2F25%3AN0000018" target="_blank" >RIV/25840886:_____/25:N0000018 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-025-10046-y?utm_source=getftr&utm_medium=getftr&utm_campaign=getftr_pilot&getft_integrator=clarivate" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11238-025-10046-y?utm_source=getftr&utm_medium=getftr&utm_campaign=getftr_pilot&getft_integrator=clarivate</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-025-10046-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11238-025-10046-y</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Persuasion with simplistic worldviews

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a simplistic worldview: while he knows the correct marginal distributions of the dimensions, he ignores the dependency between the two dimensions of the state. As a benchmark, we first characterize optimal disclosure when the receiver is rational, i.e. when the receiver knows the correct prior distribution and thus shares a common prior with the sender. Then, we provide a characterization for the sender’s gain from persuasion when the receiver is naive, and contrast our results to the benchmark. Finally, we show that the receiver benefits from having a simplistic worldview if and only if it makes him perceive the states in which his interest is aligned with the sender as less likely.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Persuasion with simplistic worldviews

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study a Bayesian persuasion model with two-dimensional states of the world, in which the sender (she) and receiver (he) have heterogeneous prior beliefs and care about different dimensions. The receiver is a naive agent who has a simplistic worldview: while he knows the correct marginal distributions of the dimensions, he ignores the dependency between the two dimensions of the state. As a benchmark, we first characterize optimal disclosure when the receiver is rational, i.e. when the receiver knows the correct prior distribution and thus shares a common prior with the sender. Then, we provide a characterization for the sender’s gain from persuasion when the receiver is naive, and contrast our results to the benchmark. Finally, we show that the receiver benefits from having a simplistic worldview if and only if it makes him perceive the states in which his interest is aligned with the sender as less likely.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Theory and Decision

ISSN

0040-5833

e-ISSN

1573-7187

Svazek periodika

99

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

677-700

Kód UT WoS článku

001493793200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105005785705