Resolved and unresolved problems in the theory of redistribution systems

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F26138077%3A_____%2F12%3A%230000487" target="_blank" >RIV/26138077:_____/12:#0000487 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/61384399:31140/12:00048572

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Resolved and unresolved problems in the theory of redistribution systems

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This study adopts the approach (and context) taken by J. Neumann and O. Morgenstern in describing, defining and finding solutions to simple majority game of three players and applies it to finding similar solutions in the redistribution system of three players. This system allows us to analyse situations in which the volume of what can be divided between players is determined by the way the players divide it, i.e. it is one of the examples of a non-constant sum game. As we anticipace a fully symmetric situation, we may define the term of ?expected average payoff?. From the term ?expected average payoff? the concept of commonly acceptable equilibrium is derived. The distribution of wage at an acceptable equilibrium point is (in general) close to Nash?ssolution to a relevant cooperative game, which is derived from the point whose coordinates coincide with the expected average wage, yet are not completely identical. In the conclusion we outline the practical use of the model based on the

Název v anglickém jazyce

Resolved and unresolved problems in the theory of redistribution systems

Popis výsledku anglicky

This study adopts the approach (and context) taken by J. Neumann and O. Morgenstern in describing, defining and finding solutions to simple majority game of three players and applies it to finding similar solutions in the redistribution system of three players. This system allows us to analyse situations in which the volume of what can be divided between players is determined by the way the players divide it, i.e. it is one of the examples of a non-constant sum game. As we anticipace a fully symmetric situation, we may define the term of ?expected average payoff?. From the term ?expected average payoff? the concept of commonly acceptable equilibrium is derived. The distribution of wage at an acceptable equilibrium point is (in general) close to Nash?ssolution to a relevant cooperative game, which is derived from the point whose coordinates coincide with the expected average wage, yet are not completely identical. In the conclusion we outline the practical use of the model based on the

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of 30th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics

ISBN

978-80-7248-779-0

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

31-36

Název nakladatele

Slezská univerzita v Opavě

Místo vydání

Opava

Místo konání akce

Karviná

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—