Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F26482789%3A_____%2F17%3AN0000032" target="_blank" >RIV/26482789:_____/17:N0000032 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://acta.mendelu.cz/artkey/acu-201704-0031.php" target="_blank" >https://acta.mendelu.cz/artkey/acu-201704-0031.php</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.11118/actaun201765041393" target="_blank" >10.11118/actaun201765041393</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The article focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Can Game Theory Help to Mitigate Water Conflicts in the Syrdarya Basin?

Popis výsledku anglicky

The article focuses on methods to resolve the ongoing conflict between countries in the Syrdarya Basin, namely Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, over water allocation. It addresses the problem by using the cooperative games framework. It identifies difficulties of choosing the most suitable solution to the Nash bargaining problem under the current circumstances and also reveals complications that may obstruct negotiations on water allocation. The latter is done by using a simplified model from a different subject field which explains why the negotiations have sequential character. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is recommended as optimal in the concrete situation because it takes into account efficiency of water use of the involved parties and its sequential use leads to a Pareto optimal outcome. Also a compromise between the Kalai-Smorodinsky and dictator solutions can be considered for the current case.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis

ISSN

1211-8516

e-ISSN

2464-8310

Svazek periodika

65

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

1393-1401

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85028821243