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Russian Agression against Ukraine as the Accelerator of the Systemic Struggle against Dissinformation in the Czech Republic

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F26482789%3A_____%2F22%3A10152455" target="_blank" >RIV/26482789:_____/22:10152455 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="https://acigjournal.com/resources/html/article/details?id=233036" target="_blank" >https://acigjournal.com/resources/html/article/details?id=233036</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0016.0916" target="_blank" >10.5604/01.3001.0016.0916</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Russian Agression against Ukraine as the Accelerator of the Systemic Struggle against Dissinformation in the Czech Republic

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    In the last decade the Czech Republic&apos;s foreign and security policies were destabilised by the activities of external actors, with Russia in the leading role, and also by internal actors who followed the Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation campaigns and/or actively participated in such subversive activities. After 2015, within the set of crises and their securitisation , a disinformation network was developed in the Czech Republic using social media and so-called &apos;alternative online media&apos; for the dissemination of disinformation, misinformation, fake news and chain mails to spread these campaigns. As leading persons in the executive belonged to the disinformers, the government was not able to develop working strategies against the disinformation campaigns as the new hybrid threat until 2021. At the end of 2021, the new Czech government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala launched a new strategy regarding hybrid threats which contained disinformation. The one-year plan to establish a systemic platform for the struggle against such threats was challenged by Russian aggression against Ukraine. In this article, we analyse the development of the security eco-system in the Czech Republic against these hybrid threats, specifically the acceleration and intensification of this activity after 24 February 2022.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Russian Agression against Ukraine as the Accelerator of the Systemic Struggle against Dissinformation in the Czech Republic

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    In the last decade the Czech Republic&apos;s foreign and security policies were destabilised by the activities of external actors, with Russia in the leading role, and also by internal actors who followed the Russian and pro-Kremlin propaganda and disinformation campaigns and/or actively participated in such subversive activities. After 2015, within the set of crises and their securitisation , a disinformation network was developed in the Czech Republic using social media and so-called &apos;alternative online media&apos; for the dissemination of disinformation, misinformation, fake news and chain mails to spread these campaigns. As leading persons in the executive belonged to the disinformers, the government was not able to develop working strategies against the disinformation campaigns as the new hybrid threat until 2021. At the end of 2021, the new Czech government of Prime Minister Petr Fiala launched a new strategy regarding hybrid threats which contained disinformation. The one-year plan to establish a systemic platform for the struggle against such threats was challenged by Russian aggression against Ukraine. In this article, we analyse the development of the security eco-system in the Czech Republic against these hybrid threats, specifically the acceleration and intensification of this activity after 24 February 2022.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    J<sub>ost</sub> - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    50601 - Political science

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

  • Návaznosti

    S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2022

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název periodika

    Applied Cybersecurity &amp; Internet Governance

  • ISSN

    2956-3119

  • e-ISSN

  • Svazek periodika

    1

  • Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

    1/2022

  • Stát vydavatele periodika

    PL - Polská republika

  • Počet stran výsledku

    16

  • Strana od-do

    1-16

  • Kód UT WoS článku

  • EID výsledku v databázi Scopus