Bridging Which Gaps? The European Union’s Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Common Security and Defence Policy Missions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F26482789%3A_____%2F25%3A10152813" target="_blank" >RIV/26482789:_____/25:10152813 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2025.2468530" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2025.2468530</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2025.2468530" target="_blank" >10.1080/14751798.2025.2468530</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Bridging Which Gaps? The European Union’s Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Common Security and Defence Policy Missions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Scholarship and policy documents largely explain the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in European Union&apos;s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions based on cost-savings and lack of in-house resources by member states (MSs). In this article, we develop a more comprehensive explanation of the EU&apos;s increasing use of PMSCs in CSDP missions as the outcome of three overlapping gaps: those between capabilities and expectations, consensus and expectations, as well as intentions and implementation. To probe our multiple gaps argument, we analyse security privatization during CSDP missions, focusing on operation EUBAM Libya. Our plausibility probe shows that PMSCs do not always provide capabilities that are in short supply within the EU, thereby magnifying the effectiveness of EU external action. In operations like EUBAM Libya, contractor support was hardly efficient or effective and covered capabilities that MSs&apos; security forces widely possess. However, the EU is often unable to activate and deploy national forces due to disagreements between MSs as well as bureaucratic constraints within MSs. Hence, a focus on political constraints and bureaucratic hurdles can effectively complement capabilities gaps in providing a thick, multicausal explanation of contractor support to EU crisis management.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Bridging Which Gaps? The European Union’s Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Common Security and Defence Policy Missions

Popis výsledku anglicky

Scholarship and policy documents largely explain the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in European Union&apos;s (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions based on cost-savings and lack of in-house resources by member states (MSs). In this article, we develop a more comprehensive explanation of the EU&apos;s increasing use of PMSCs in CSDP missions as the outcome of three overlapping gaps: those between capabilities and expectations, consensus and expectations, as well as intentions and implementation. To probe our multiple gaps argument, we analyse security privatization during CSDP missions, focusing on operation EUBAM Libya. Our plausibility probe shows that PMSCs do not always provide capabilities that are in short supply within the EU, thereby magnifying the effectiveness of EU external action. In operations like EUBAM Libya, contractor support was hardly efficient or effective and covered capabilities that MSs&apos; security forces widely possess. However, the EU is often unable to activate and deploy national forces due to disagreements between MSs as well as bureaucratic constraints within MSs. Hence, a focus on political constraints and bureaucratic hurdles can effectively complement capabilities gaps in providing a thick, multicausal explanation of contractor support to EU crisis management.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA24-10160S" target="_blank" >GA24-10160S: Dvacet pět let protiteroristické politiky EU: Nové výzvy, staré problémy?</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Defence and Security Analysis

ISSN

1475-1798

e-ISSN

1475-1801

Svazek periodika

43

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

27

Strana od-do

464-489

Kód UT WoS článku

001433416200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105014361183