Cost-Benefit Analysis: Too Often Biased

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F15%3A43886891" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/15:43886891 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2015-4-005" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2015-4-005</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2015-4-005" target="_blank" >10.15240/tul/001/2015-4-005</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Too Often Biased

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Cost-benefi t analysis (CBA) is widely applied in many countries in evaluating public projects and regulatory instruments. It is employed, for example, as a basis for decisions within the European Union's subsidy policy. CBA enables to express the comprehensive effect of a project or a governmental regulation on social welfare and thereby to introduce expertise to political decision-making. However, its practical applications face many problems. Different methodological choices in performing CBA enableto obtain diametrically opposite conclusions. Moreover, the way how investors apply for EU Fund subsidies encourages CBA performers to adjust CBA results to requirements of subsidy applicants. The unavoidable consequence is frequently mendacious, unreliable and misleading CBA. The paper brings an overview of the fl exibility in CBA methodological choices. It further focuses on analysing the CBA performance practice in the area of CBA project appraisal for the purposes of applying for EU

Název v anglickém jazyce

Cost-Benefit Analysis: Too Often Biased

Popis výsledku anglicky

Cost-benefi t analysis (CBA) is widely applied in many countries in evaluating public projects and regulatory instruments. It is employed, for example, as a basis for decisions within the European Union's subsidy policy. CBA enables to express the comprehensive effect of a project or a governmental regulation on social welfare and thereby to introduce expertise to political decision-making. However, its practical applications face many problems. Different methodological choices in performing CBA enableto obtain diametrically opposite conclusions. Moreover, the way how investors apply for EU Fund subsidies encourages CBA performers to adjust CBA results to requirements of subsidy applicants. The unavoidable consequence is frequently mendacious, unreliable and misleading CBA. The paper brings an overview of the fl exibility in CBA methodological choices. It further focuses on analysing the CBA performance practice in the area of CBA project appraisal for the purposes of applying for EU

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AE - Řízení, správa a administrativa

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

E+M. Ekonomie a Management

ISSN

1212-3609

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

18

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

68-77

Kód UT WoS článku

000368316100005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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