Negotiating land for flood risk management : upstream-downstream in the light of economic game theory

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F18%3A43893674" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/18:43893674 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/61384399:31150/18:00050632

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfr3.12317" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jfr3.12317</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jfr3.12317" target="_blank" >10.1111/jfr3.12317</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Negotiating land for flood risk management : upstream-downstream in the light of economic game theory

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper discusses the use of game theory as a method to achieve land and water governance for flood retention and resilience on a catchment scale. Therefore, it addresses flood retention in river catchments by using pay-off matrices of game theory. How do pay-off matrices between upstream and downstream change when certain property rights are adjusted or institutional conditions are changed? What if liability issues, responsibilities, and externalities of flood protection measures are reframed? Who should pay and who profit from retention measures? Individual scenarios correspond to some basic games from the game theory. The aim of these thought experiments is to develop rules for upstream-downstream agreements on retention and resilience within a river basin area.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Negotiating land for flood risk management : upstream-downstream in the light of economic game theory

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper discusses the use of game theory as a method to achieve land and water governance for flood retention and resilience on a catchment scale. Therefore, it addresses flood retention in river catchments by using pay-off matrices of game theory. How do pay-off matrices between upstream and downstream change when certain property rights are adjusted or institutional conditions are changed? What if liability issues, responsibilities, and externalities of flood protection measures are reframed? Who should pay and who profit from retention measures? Individual scenarios correspond to some basic games from the game theory. The aim of these thought experiments is to develop rules for upstream-downstream agreements on retention and resilience within a river basin area.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

10503 - Water resources

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Flood Risk Management

ISSN

1753-318X

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

66-75

Kód UT WoS článku

000428435400008

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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