An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F18%3A43893737" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/18:43893737 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00712-017-0578-9</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper aims to explain the behavior of certain religious organizations in countries with severe regulation that limits the religious market, such as those under communist rule. Religious organizations in those countries sometimes choose to operate both legally and illegally. The model proposed here shows that such behavior may increase the consumer welfare of religionists compared to solely legal or illegal provision of religious services. It assumes that religious organizations maximize the consumer surplus of their adherents. The choice of a religious organization between legal and illegal provision of religious services depends on the costs of religious participation imposed by the government and the set-up costs of dual operation. As an illustration, the paper accounts for the different response of the Catholic Church to restrictions imposed by the communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Název v anglickém jazyce

An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper aims to explain the behavior of certain religious organizations in countries with severe regulation that limits the religious market, such as those under communist rule. Religious organizations in those countries sometimes choose to operate both legally and illegally. The model proposed here shows that such behavior may increase the consumer welfare of religionists compared to solely legal or illegal provision of religious services. It assumes that religious organizations maximize the consumer surplus of their adherents. The choice of a religious organization between legal and illegal provision of religious services depends on the costs of religious participation imposed by the government and the set-up costs of dual operation. As an illustration, the paper accounts for the different response of the Catholic Church to restrictions imposed by the communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Economics

ISSN

0931-8658

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

124

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

AT - Rakouská republika

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

289-302

Kód UT WoS článku

000435528300004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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