Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F44555601%3A13510%2F21%3A43896064" target="_blank" >RIV/44555601:13510/21:43896064 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11149-020-09421-0</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Popis výsledku anglicky

A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry regulations and standards for its members. A key question is whether oversight by an SRO can replace governmental oversight, or whether supplementary governmental oversight is necessary. Using a formal model for the financial sector, and solving simultaneous games, I show that a lack of commitment by the SRO may necessitate governmental oversight of both SRO members and the SRO itself. The core of the model is supported by economics experiments.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50204 - Business and management

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Regulatory Economics

ISSN

0922-680X

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

59

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

161-174

Kód UT WoS článku

000604468800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—