New materialism and postmodern subject models fail to explain human memory and self-awareness: A comment on Tobias-Renstrom and Koppe (2020)

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F47122099%3A_____%2F21%3AN0000016" target="_blank" >RIV/47122099:_____/21:N0000016 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959354320973757" target="_blank" >https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0959354320973757</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354320973757" target="_blank" >10.1177/0959354320973757</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

New materialism and postmodern subject models fail to explain human memory and self-awareness: A comment on Tobias-Renstrom and Koppe (2020)

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and research. The present study continues this discussion and argues that the applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. While the arguments of new materialism are in accordance with the analysis of the act of observation performed by an external observer, some problems arise when trying to theoretically approach the first-person subjective experience of a human subject. For example, new materialism fails to explain why human minds can maintain the awareness of a subject’s identity throughout their lives and to recall the memories about their past personal experiences.

Název v anglickém jazyce

New materialism and postmodern subject models fail to explain human memory and self-awareness: A comment on Tobias-Renstrom and Koppe (2020)

Popis výsledku anglicky

Tobias-Renstrøm and Køppe (2020) show the several conceptual limits that new materialism and postmodern subject models have for psychological theory and research. The present study continues this discussion and argues that the applicability of the ideas of quantum-inspired new materialism depends on the theoretical perspectives that we consider for analysis: be it the first-person perspective referring to the subjective experience of a human subject, or the third-person perspective, in which a human subject is observed by an external observer. While the arguments of new materialism are in accordance with the analysis of the act of observation performed by an external observer, some problems arise when trying to theoretically approach the first-person subjective experience of a human subject. For example, new materialism fails to explain why human minds can maintain the awareness of a subject’s identity throughout their lives and to recall the memories about their past personal experiences.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50103 - Cognitive sciences

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Theory and Psychology

ISSN

0959-3543

e-ISSN

1461-7447

Svazek periodika

31

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

130-137

Kód UT WoS článku

000599219700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85096544620