Application of an Asymmetric Banzhaf Power Index: The Case of the Czech Parliament

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F47813059%3A19520%2F14%3A%230002930" target="_blank" >RIV/47813059:19520/14:#0002930 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://mme2014.upol.cz/conference-proceedings" target="_blank" >http://mme2014.upol.cz/conference-proceedings</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Application of an Asymmetric Banzhaf Power Index: The Case of the Czech Parliament

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In general, parliamentary voting can be described as a cooperative game with transferable utility function with political parties as agents of the game. Studies of decision-making process of parliamentary voting from the mathematical point of view usually cover studies on power and influence of coalitions. As a measure of players' power, the concept of power indices was introduced in the second half of the last century. One of the widely used power indices - Banzhaf power index - also called Penrose-Banzhaf or Banzhaf-Coleman power index - is based on the concept of 'swing voters' in possible coalitions. The Banzhaf power index is derived from the assumption of random voting. However, real world results differ from theoretical assumptions. For exampleGelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004) and Gelman, Katz and Tuerlinckx (2002) have shown that the assumption is violated in large voting bodies. In order to fit real world conditions, adjustments of the index were done by Hu (2006), who proposed

Název v anglickém jazyce

Application of an Asymmetric Banzhaf Power Index: The Case of the Czech Parliament

Popis výsledku anglicky

In general, parliamentary voting can be described as a cooperative game with transferable utility function with political parties as agents of the game. Studies of decision-making process of parliamentary voting from the mathematical point of view usually cover studies on power and influence of coalitions. As a measure of players' power, the concept of power indices was introduced in the second half of the last century. One of the widely used power indices - Banzhaf power index - also called Penrose-Banzhaf or Banzhaf-Coleman power index - is based on the concept of 'swing voters' in possible coalitions. The Banzhaf power index is derived from the assumption of random voting. However, real world results differ from theoretical assumptions. For exampleGelman, Katz and Bafumi (2004) and Gelman, Katz and Tuerlinckx (2002) have shown that the assumption is violated in large voting bodies. In order to fit real world conditions, adjustments of the index were done by Hu (2006), who proposed

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA14-02424S" target="_blank" >GA14-02424S: Metody operačního výzkumu pro podporu rozhodování v podmínkách neurčitosti</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

32nd International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics MME 2014 Conference Proceedings

ISBN

978-80-244-4209-9

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

655-660

Název nakladatele

Palacký University, Olomouc, Křížovského 8, 771 47 Olomouc, www.vydavatelstvi.upol.cz

Místo vydání

Olomouc

Místo konání akce

Palacký University, Olomouc

Datum konání akce

10. 9. 2014

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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