Shapley Values of Cooperative Games with I-Fuzzy Expectations

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F47813059%3A19520%2F15%3A%230003525" target="_blank" >RIV/47813059:19520/15:#0003525 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Shapley Values of Cooperative Games with I-Fuzzy Expectations

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In the cooperative game theory players of a game are cooperating in order to increase a mutual profit. The cooperative game theory considers the question of a profit distribution, and provides several solution concepts; one of them is the concept of a Shapley value. In reality, the expected pay-offs are not always exactly given - they can be only expected with some precision. One of the possible approaches that include an uncertainty into cooperative games is the fuzzy-sets approach. This approach expect that players knows a degree of membership of specific expected payoffs. However, the real situation should be better covered, when also the part of indecisiveness about the future pay-offs is considered, as in I-fuzzy sets, described originally as Atanassov intuitionistic fuzzy sets. The main aim of this article is to discuss the construction of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games when pay-offs are vague, in this case expressed as I-fuzzy numbers, and compare pr

Název v anglickém jazyce

Shapley Values of Cooperative Games with I-Fuzzy Expectations

Popis výsledku anglicky

In the cooperative game theory players of a game are cooperating in order to increase a mutual profit. The cooperative game theory considers the question of a profit distribution, and provides several solution concepts; one of them is the concept of a Shapley value. In reality, the expected pay-offs are not always exactly given - they can be only expected with some precision. One of the possible approaches that include an uncertainty into cooperative games is the fuzzy-sets approach. This approach expect that players knows a degree of membership of specific expected payoffs. However, the real situation should be better covered, when also the part of indecisiveness about the future pay-offs is considered, as in I-fuzzy sets, described originally as Atanassov intuitionistic fuzzy sets. The main aim of this article is to discuss the construction of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games when pay-offs are vague, in this case expressed as I-fuzzy numbers, and compare pr

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA14-02424S" target="_blank" >GA14-02424S: Metody operačního výzkumu pro podporu rozhodování v podmínkách neurčitosti</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

33rd International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics MME2015: Conference Proceedings

ISBN

978-80-261-0539-8

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

537-542

Název nakladatele

University of West Bohemia, Plzeň

Místo vydání

Plzeň, Czech Republic

Místo konání akce

Cheb, Czech Republic

Datum konání akce

9. 9. 2015

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—