NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence: The case of Russian violations of the Estonian airspace

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F48546054%3A_____%2F22%3AN0000022" target="_blank" >RIV/48546054:_____/22:N0000022 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2022.2028464" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2022.2028464</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2028464" target="_blank" >10.1080/13523260.2022.2028464</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence: The case of Russian violations of the Estonian airspace

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The question of how to deter sub-conventional activities—characterized by a limited role for the use of force—is one of the biggest puzzles in security studies. A way forward might be to use an enduring rivalry conflict management framework and to focus on findings from criminology. As the case study of 56 Estonian airspace violations suggests, executing sub-conventional deterrence is not an easy task to achieve. NATO’s deterrence success remains elusive, because there is no consistency in responding to these violations and no meaningful punishment. Yet many changes in frequency, intensity, and volatility of Russian intrusions over the last two decades indicate that a successful dissuasion, if not de-escalation, is still possible. To achieve that, NATO needs to improve information transmission, define its deterrence goals more narrowly, impose group-level costs, and implement dynamic deterrence mechanisms offering alternative modes of behavior.

Název v anglickém jazyce

NATO’s sub-conventional deterrence: The case of Russian violations of the Estonian airspace

Popis výsledku anglicky

The question of how to deter sub-conventional activities—characterized by a limited role for the use of force—is one of the biggest puzzles in security studies. A way forward might be to use an enduring rivalry conflict management framework and to focus on findings from criminology. As the case study of 56 Estonian airspace violations suggests, executing sub-conventional deterrence is not an easy task to achieve. NATO’s deterrence success remains elusive, because there is no consistency in responding to these violations and no meaningful punishment. Yet many changes in frequency, intensity, and volatility of Russian intrusions over the last two decades indicate that a successful dissuasion, if not de-escalation, is still possible. To achieve that, NATO needs to improve information transmission, define its deterrence goals more narrowly, impose group-level costs, and implement dynamic deterrence mechanisms offering alternative modes of behavior.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-19693S" target="_blank" >GA20-19693S: Adaptace rámce pro strategickou analýzu na bezpečnostní prostředí současnosti</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Contemporary Security Policy

ISSN

1352-3260

e-ISSN

1743-8764

Svazek periodika

43

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

350-381

Kód UT WoS článku

000744303200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85122927002