Veritas Filia Temporis: The origins of the idea of scientific progress
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23330%2F16%3A43929514" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23330/16:43929514 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2016.1178804" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2016.1178804</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00033790.2016.1178804" target="_blank" >10.1080/00033790.2016.1178804</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Veritas Filia Temporis: The origins of the idea of scientific progress
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The article provides insight into the epistemological and anthropological aspect of the origination of the idea of scientific progress. It focuses on the relationship between individual's limited lifetime and the immensity of nature. The basic assumption is that the idea of scientific progress offers a solution of the epistemological problem stemming from the finding that there is no (teleological) coincidence between human cognitive abilities and the extent of nature. In order to facilitate the understanding of the origin of the idea of scientific progress, I propose distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive concepts of progress. While the descriptive notion of progress expresses the cumulative character of scientific knowledge and the superiority of the present over preceding generations, the prescriptive concept pertains to progressivist epistemology directing scientific research at the future development of knowledge. This article claims that the prevalent concept in Antiquity was the descriptive concept of scientific progress. The prescriptive notion had developed only in ancient astronomy. Early modern science was faced with similar issues as ancient astronomy - mainly the empirical finding related to the inexhaustible character of nature. Consequently to the introduction of the idea of progress, the progress of sciences became a purpose in itself - hence becoming infinite.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Veritas Filia Temporis: The origins of the idea of scientific progress
Popis výsledku anglicky
The article provides insight into the epistemological and anthropological aspect of the origination of the idea of scientific progress. It focuses on the relationship between individual's limited lifetime and the immensity of nature. The basic assumption is that the idea of scientific progress offers a solution of the epistemological problem stemming from the finding that there is no (teleological) coincidence between human cognitive abilities and the extent of nature. In order to facilitate the understanding of the origin of the idea of scientific progress, I propose distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive concepts of progress. While the descriptive notion of progress expresses the cumulative character of scientific knowledge and the superiority of the present over preceding generations, the prescriptive concept pertains to progressivist epistemology directing scientific research at the future development of knowledge. This article claims that the prevalent concept in Antiquity was the descriptive concept of scientific progress. The prescriptive notion had developed only in ancient astronomy. Early modern science was faced with similar issues as ancient astronomy - mainly the empirical finding related to the inexhaustible character of nature. Consequently to the introduction of the idea of progress, the progress of sciences became a purpose in itself - hence becoming infinite.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>x</sub> - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)
CEP obor
AA - Filosofie a náboženství
OECD FORD obor
—
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GAP401%2F12%2F0129" target="_blank" >GAP401/12/0129: Veritas filia temporis: Zrození ideje teoretického pokroku</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2016
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Annals of Science
ISSN
0003-3790
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
73
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
4
Stát vydavatele periodika
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
Počet stran výsledku
17
Strana od-do
375-391
Kód UT WoS článku
000386002900003
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-84974691622