Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23520%2F11%3A43898961" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23520/11:43898961 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x" target="_blank" >10.1111/j.1475-4932.2010.00692.x</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This article attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question, we set up a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policy interact, and imbalances (bubbles) can occur in the medium-run. Considering several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policy-makers, theanalysis shows that the answer depends on a number of characteristics of the economy, as well as on the monetary and fiscal policy preferences with respect to inflation and output stabilisation. We show that socially optimal financial instability prevention should be carried out by: (i) both monetary and fiscal policy (sharing region) under some circumstances; and (ii) fiscal policy only (specialisation region) under others. There is, however, a moral hazard problem: both policy-makers

Název v anglickém jazyce

Macroprudential Policies and Financial Stability

Popis výsledku anglicky

This article attempts to assess to what extent the central bank or the government should respond to developments that can cause financial instability, such as housing or asset bubbles, overextended budgetary policies or excessive public and household debt. To analyse this question, we set up a simple reduced-form model in which monetary and fiscal policy interact, and imbalances (bubbles) can occur in the medium-run. Considering several scenarios with both benevolent and idiosyncratic policy-makers, theanalysis shows that the answer depends on a number of characteristics of the economy, as well as on the monetary and fiscal policy preferences with respect to inflation and output stabilisation. We show that socially optimal financial instability prevention should be carried out by: (i) both monetary and fiscal policy (sharing region) under some circumstances; and (ii) fiscal policy only (specialisation region) under others. There is, however, a moral hazard problem: both policy-makers

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2011

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

The Economic Record

ISSN

0013-0249

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

87

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

277

Stát vydavatele periodika

AU - Austrálie

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

318-334

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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