Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12260%2F18%3A43898839" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12260/18:43898839 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artifacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artifacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artifacts have for morality is entirely dependent on human beings, since artifacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artifacts, in which moral agency is ascribed to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek's account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on postphenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek's account.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts
Popis výsledku anglicky
One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artifacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artifacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artifacts have for morality is entirely dependent on human beings, since artifacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artifacts, in which moral agency is ascribed to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek's account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on postphenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek's account.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/TL01000467" target="_blank" >TL01000467: Etika provozu autonomních vozidel</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2018
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Organon F
ISSN
1335-0668
e-ISSN
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Svazek periodika
25
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
4
Stát vydavatele periodika
SK - Slovenská republika
Počet stran výsledku
22
Strana od-do
517-538
Kód UT WoS článku
000453343400005
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85058270016