Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

RIV/60076658:12260/18:43898839 - isvavai.cz

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artifacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artifacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artifacts have for morality is entirely dependent on human beings, since artifacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artifacts, in which moral agency is ascribed to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek's account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on postphenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek's account.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Verbeek on the moral agency of artifacts

Popis výsledku anglicky

One of the important questions discussed by philosophers of technology has to do with the moral significance of artifacts in human life. While many philosophers agree that artifacts do have moral significance attached to them, opinions vary as to how it is to be construed. In this paper we deal with the approach of the influential Dutch philosopher of technology Peter Paul Verbeek. He criticizes traditional ethical theories for assuming that whatever relevancy artifacts have for morality is entirely dependent on human beings, since artifacts are mere passive instruments of human agency. In contrast, he develops a view of moral agency that includes artifacts, in which moral agency is ascribed to human-technology hybrids rather than to humans as such. The goal of this paper is to elucidate Verbeek's account of moral agency and evaluate it. We also deal with his views on postphenomenology and mediation underlying this account. Although the general gist of our paper is expository, we point out to several problems for Verbeek's account.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

TL01000467: Etika provozu autonomních vozidel

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Organon F

ISSN

1335-0668

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

25

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

517-538

Kód UT WoS článku

000453343400005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85058270016