On the Alleged Evidence for Non-Unpleasant Pains

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60076658%3A12260%2F19%3A43902407" target="_blank" >RIV/60076658:12260/19:43902407 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658625?journalCode=sinq20" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658625?journalCode=sinq20</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658625" target="_blank" >10.1080/0020174X.2019.1658625</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

On the Alleged Evidence for Non-Unpleasant Pains

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Pains are unpleasant, universally unpleasant. What seems trivially true has been rejected by various pain scientists because of several phenomena which allegedly show that there can be pain which is not unpleasant. This rejection is partly based on the ambiguity of ‘pain unpleasantness’ which can be avoided by distinguishing between primary and secondary pain affect. As for the alleged counterexamples to the above, I will argue that experiences of episodic analgesia as well as the ‘pain’ experiences of some lobotomized and morphine patients should not be construed as cases in which pain and unpleasantness come apart, but rather as cases in which nociceptive activity and pain dissociate. Regarding the notorious case of pain asymbolia, I will demonstrate that the behaviour of patients with this syndrome suggests that they do feel pain, and that their pain sensations are unpleasant, but much less unpleasant than the pains normal people would have if exposed to the same noxious stimuli. Adopting such an account of these phenomena allows us to retain the widely accepted IASP definition of pain, and thus avoids the issue of integrating non-unpleasant pains into a plausible definition of pain.

Název v anglickém jazyce

On the Alleged Evidence for Non-Unpleasant Pains

Popis výsledku anglicky

Pains are unpleasant, universally unpleasant. What seems trivially true has been rejected by various pain scientists because of several phenomena which allegedly show that there can be pain which is not unpleasant. This rejection is partly based on the ambiguity of ‘pain unpleasantness’ which can be avoided by distinguishing between primary and secondary pain affect. As for the alleged counterexamples to the above, I will argue that experiences of episodic analgesia as well as the ‘pain’ experiences of some lobotomized and morphine patients should not be construed as cases in which pain and unpleasantness come apart, but rather as cases in which nociceptive activity and pain dissociate. Regarding the notorious case of pain asymbolia, I will demonstrate that the behaviour of patients with this syndrome suggests that they do feel pain, and that their pain sensations are unpleasant, but much less unpleasant than the pains normal people would have if exposed to the same noxious stimuli. Adopting such an account of these phenomena allows us to retain the widely accepted IASP definition of pain, and thus avoids the issue of integrating non-unpleasant pains into a plausible definition of pain.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

O - Projekt operacniho programu

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy

ISSN

0020-174X

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

62

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

srpen

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

1-19

Kód UT WoS článku

000483393100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85071189359