Deeds and Words: Farmers' Attitude-Paradox in Collective Action for Small-Scale Irrigation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60460709%3A41110%2F23%3A97458" target="_blank" >RIV/60460709:41110/23:97458 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/20/1/549" target="_blank" >https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/20/1/549</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20010549" target="_blank" >10.3390/ijerph20010549</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Deeds and Words: Farmers' Attitude-Paradox in Collective Action for Small-Scale Irrigation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We explore the mechanisms of the attitude–behavior paradox and how multiple stakeholders strategize to compromise their attitudes and behaviors. Through an instrumental variable probit model, we examine the effect of income heterogeneity and social ties on the farmers’ attitude–behavior paradox for collective action. The empirical results demonstrate that weak and strong ties, income heterogeneity, interaction terms, education, community environment, and community rules negatively affect the paradox, whereas water stealing and water use conflicts positively affect it. After dividing the paradox into two forms, we find that weak ties, the interaction terms thereof, negatively affect the paradox for “having negative attitude but do have behavior”, while income heterogeneity negatively affects the paradox for “having positive attitude but no behavior”. We contribute to the understanding of mechanisms whereby economic incentives and social structures interplay in addressing the above paradox. We conclude by discussing the implications for policies to overcome this social dilemma.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Deeds and Words: Farmers' Attitude-Paradox in Collective Action for Small-Scale Irrigation

Popis výsledku anglicky

We explore the mechanisms of the attitude–behavior paradox and how multiple stakeholders strategize to compromise their attitudes and behaviors. Through an instrumental variable probit model, we examine the effect of income heterogeneity and social ties on the farmers’ attitude–behavior paradox for collective action. The empirical results demonstrate that weak and strong ties, income heterogeneity, interaction terms, education, community environment, and community rules negatively affect the paradox, whereas water stealing and water use conflicts positively affect it. After dividing the paradox into two forms, we find that weak ties, the interaction terms thereof, negatively affect the paradox for “having negative attitude but do have behavior”, while income heterogeneity negatively affects the paradox for “having positive attitude but no behavior”. We contribute to the understanding of mechanisms whereby economic incentives and social structures interplay in addressing the above paradox. We conclude by discussing the implications for policies to overcome this social dilemma.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

ISSN

1660-4601

e-ISSN

1660-4601

Svazek periodika

20

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000909367600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85145965780