Human-Conceptual Morality and the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Virtue-Ethical Approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61988987%3A17250%2F25%3AA2603CC1" target="_blank" >RIV/61988987:17250/25:A2603CC1 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42095" target="_blank" >https://journals.phil.muni.cz/profil/article/view/42095</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/pf25-2-42095" target="_blank" >10.5817/pf25-2-42095</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Human-Conceptual Morality and the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Virtue-Ethical Approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper examines the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics by exploring its different forms. Advocating a mind-dependent interpretation, it builds on the naturalistic virtue ethics of Philippa Foot. By proposing several modifications to Foot’s theory—incorporating insights from contemporary biology and synthesizing naturalistic and constructivist approaches—the paper argues that while certain parts of non-human nature may possess intrinsic value based on natural teleology, the evaluative process is exclusively human-centred. This claim becomes even more evident in the transition from intrinsic to moral value. Ultimately, the paper suggests that moral consideration of the environment depends less on adherence to norms and more on the moral character and motivation of the acting agent.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Human-Conceptual Morality and the Intrinsic Value of Nature: A Virtue-Ethical Approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper examines the concept of intrinsic value in environmental ethics by exploring its different forms. Advocating a mind-dependent interpretation, it builds on the naturalistic virtue ethics of Philippa Foot. By proposing several modifications to Foot’s theory—incorporating insights from contemporary biology and synthesizing naturalistic and constructivist approaches—the paper argues that while certain parts of non-human nature may possess intrinsic value based on natural teleology, the evaluative process is exclusively human-centred. This claim becomes even more evident in the transition from intrinsic to moral value. Ultimately, the paper suggests that moral consideration of the environment depends less on adherence to norms and more on the moral character and motivation of the acting agent.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60300 - Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

O - Projekt operacniho programu

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Pro-Fil

ISSN

1212-9097

e-ISSN

1212-9097

Svazek periodika

—

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

53-65

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105024779856