Application of Cooperative Game Solution Concepts to a Collusive Oligopoly Game

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61988987%3A17310%2F12%3AA130153W" target="_blank" >RIV/61988987:17310/12:A130153W - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Application of Cooperative Game Solution Concepts to a Collusive Oligopoly Game

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

An oligopoly is a market where a couple of large producers supply some goods. If the oligopoly is collusive, the producers form coalitions. Then, within each of the coalitions, the producers wish to divide their total profit among themselves. They coulduse a cooperative transferable utility game solution concept, such as the core, if the game were in the coalitional form. This, however, is not the case. In this paper, we propose an approach to overcome that difficulty: converting the collusive oligopoly into the partition function form, we show how the known cooperative game solution concepts (core, bargaining set) can be applied to that game. Actually, the proposed approach is suitable not only for a collusive oligopoly, but, under some assumptions,for any cooperative strategic form game.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Application of Cooperative Game Solution Concepts to a Collusive Oligopoly Game

Popis výsledku anglicky

An oligopoly is a market where a couple of large producers supply some goods. If the oligopoly is collusive, the producers form coalitions. Then, within each of the coalitions, the producers wish to divide their total profit among themselves. They coulduse a cooperative transferable utility game solution concept, such as the core, if the game were in the coalitional form. This, however, is not the case. In this paper, we propose an approach to overcome that difficulty: converting the collusive oligopoly into the partition function form, we show how the known cooperative game solution concepts (core, bargaining set) can be applied to that game. Actually, the proposed approach is suitable not only for a collusive oligopoly, but, under some assumptions,for any cooperative strategic form game.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

BB - Aplikovaná statistika, operační výzkum

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of the 30th International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics 2012

ISBN

978-80-7248-779-0

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

6

Strana od-do

14-19

Název nakladatele

Silesian University in Opava. School of Business Administration in Karviná

Místo vydání

Karviná

Místo konání akce

Karviná

Datum konání akce

11. 9. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—