Attitudes: Intensionality vs. Hyperintensionality

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F03%3A00008363" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/03:00008363 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Attitudes: Intensionality vs. Hyperintensionality

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The problem of logical analysis of attitudes # to be found already in Frege#s #indirect contexts# in his Über Sinn und Bedeutung # has been handled by many leading philosophers and logicians. Frege#s contextualist approach inherited by most of them (including Montague) has been criticised by Pavel Tichý, the author of transparent intensional logic (TIL), which assumes that every expression denotes either an intension or an extension. Tichý#s solution respects the distinction between the meaning (sense)of an expression and the object denoted by the expression, but it differs from most current conceptions (including Frege#s) in at least two points: a) it logically handles the hyperintensional structure of the meaning, sense is explicated as a hyperintensional entity (construction). b) No contextualism is present: expressions denote via its sense. Empirical expressions denote always intensions, and where it seems that they denote extensions they only possess de re supposition. Thus an em

Název v anglickém jazyce

Attitudes: Intensionality vs. Hyperintensionality

Popis výsledku anglicky

The problem of logical analysis of attitudes # to be found already in Frege#s #indirect contexts# in his Über Sinn und Bedeutung # has been handled by many leading philosophers and logicians. Frege#s contextualist approach inherited by most of them (including Montague) has been criticised by Pavel Tichý, the author of transparent intensional logic (TIL), which assumes that every expression denotes either an intension or an extension. Tichý#s solution respects the distinction between the meaning (sense)of an expression and the object denoted by the expression, but it differs from most current conceptions (including Frege#s) in at least two points: a) it logically handles the hyperintensional structure of the meaning, sense is explicated as a hyperintensional entity (construction). b) No contextualism is present: expressions denote via its sense. Empirical expressions denote always intensions, and where it seems that they denote extensions they only possess de re supposition. Thus an em

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA401%2F03%2F1403" target="_blank" >GA401/03/1403: Principy logické analýzy jazykových výrazů a intenzionální logika</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2003

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Volume of Abstracts 12th International Congress of Logic, Metodology and Philosophy of Science

ISBN

ISBN 600-9913-X

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

3

Strana od-do

94-96

Název nakladatele

Universidad de Oviedo

Místo vydání

Oviedo

Místo konání akce

Oviedo

Datum konání akce

1. 1. 2003

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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