Is act theory a propositional logic without logic?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F23%3A10252775" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/23:10252775 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/is-act-theory-a-propositional-logic-without-logic" target="_blank" >https://research.rug.nl/en/publications/is-act-theory-a-propositional-logic-without-logic</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2023120928" target="_blank" >10.5840/jphil2023120928</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Is act theory a propositional logic without logic?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Act theory identifies propositions with predicative act types imbued with assertoric force. This identification turns propositions into assertoric contexts. When scaling up from atomic to molecular propositions, the issue of embedded predication crops up. Predicative act types are now located within the scope of logical operators. Assertion thereby takes narrow scope with respect to other operators. It is inherent to act theory that all molecular propositions, save conjunctive ones, induce cancellation contexts, in which assertoric force is suspended. This outcome is at odds with the philosophical idea informing the inversion of the Frege-Geach point, that is, the identification of propositions with forceful or committal act types.I have been arguing explicitly against the act-theoretic account of conjunctive and disjunctive propositions only. My general argument against conditional and negative propositions would be by extrapolation: if two kinds of molecular propositions are problematic, then so are the other molecular propositions governed by truth-functional connectives (or their act-theoretic counterparts). I am leaving all other kinds of molecular propositions-for instance, temporal, modal, attitudinal ones-untouched. This cluster of propositions is rather rudimentary in act theory, anyway, so there is not much of a stated position to react to. All in all, I have questioned the philosophical wisdom of endowing propositions with force in general and of the distribution claim in particular, and I have drawn attention to how underdeveloped the propositional logic of act-theoretic propositions is. The act-theoretic treatment of embedded predication provides no compelling reason to jettison the Frege-Geach point and subscribe to its inversion instead.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Is act theory a propositional logic without logic?

Popis výsledku anglicky

Act theory identifies propositions with predicative act types imbued with assertoric force. This identification turns propositions into assertoric contexts. When scaling up from atomic to molecular propositions, the issue of embedded predication crops up. Predicative act types are now located within the scope of logical operators. Assertion thereby takes narrow scope with respect to other operators. It is inherent to act theory that all molecular propositions, save conjunctive ones, induce cancellation contexts, in which assertoric force is suspended. This outcome is at odds with the philosophical idea informing the inversion of the Frege-Geach point, that is, the identification of propositions with forceful or committal act types.I have been arguing explicitly against the act-theoretic account of conjunctive and disjunctive propositions only. My general argument against conditional and negative propositions would be by extrapolation: if two kinds of molecular propositions are problematic, then so are the other molecular propositions governed by truth-functional connectives (or their act-theoretic counterparts). I am leaving all other kinds of molecular propositions-for instance, temporal, modal, attitudinal ones-untouched. This cluster of propositions is rather rudimentary in act theory, anyway, so there is not much of a stated position to react to. All in all, I have questioned the philosophical wisdom of endowing propositions with force in general and of the distribution claim in particular, and I have drawn attention to how underdeveloped the propositional logic of act-theoretic propositions is. The act-theoretic treatment of embedded predication provides no compelling reason to jettison the Frege-Geach point and subscribe to its inversion instead.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60300 - Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Philosophy

ISSN

0022-362X

e-ISSN

1939-8549

Svazek periodika

120

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

9

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

484-510

Kód UT WoS článku

001087694000002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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