Conditional political budget cycles in the OECD countries: the case of government expenditures
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F15%3A86094826" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/15:86094826 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Conditional political budget cycles in the OECD countries: the case of government expenditures
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
The public choice theory studies interactions of politicians, voters and bureaucrats, which can be investigated in a number of ways. In this paper, we will investigate the so-called "political budget cycle". This term is used to describe cyclical fluctuations (or systematic patterns) in the fiscal policy induced by the timing of elections. We examine the presence of the conditional political budget cycle in the OECD countries using data from 25 member states over the period 1995 - 2012. Three importantresults emerge: First, there is a statistically significant political budget cycle (PBC) in the government expenditures which is institutionally conditioned (it exists in the total government expenditures in the OECD countries with lower level of fiscalcredibility and transparency). Second, the PBC exists mainly in the specific government expenditures, e.g. social expenditures. Third, the PBC is hidden also in some government expenditures in the OECD countries with high level of credibi
Název v anglickém jazyce
Conditional political budget cycles in the OECD countries: the case of government expenditures
Popis výsledku anglicky
The public choice theory studies interactions of politicians, voters and bureaucrats, which can be investigated in a number of ways. In this paper, we will investigate the so-called "political budget cycle". This term is used to describe cyclical fluctuations (or systematic patterns) in the fiscal policy induced by the timing of elections. We examine the presence of the conditional political budget cycle in the OECD countries using data from 25 member states over the period 1995 - 2012. Three importantresults emerge: First, there is a statistically significant political budget cycle (PBC) in the government expenditures which is institutionally conditioned (it exists in the total government expenditures in the OECD countries with lower level of fiscalcredibility and transparency). Second, the PBC exists mainly in the specific government expenditures, e.g. social expenditures. Third, the PBC is hidden also in some government expenditures in the OECD countries with high level of credibi
Klasifikace
Druh
D - Stať ve sborníku
CEP obor
AH - Ekonomie
OECD FORD obor
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Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
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Návaznosti
S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2015
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název statě ve sborníku
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference "ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER COUNTRIES"
ISBN
978-80-248-3796-3
ISSN
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e-ISSN
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Počet stran výsledku
10
Strana od-do
256-265
Název nakladatele
Vysoká škola báňská - Technická univerzita Ostrava
Místo vydání
Ostrava
Místo konání akce
Ostrava
Datum konání akce
2. 9. 2015
Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti
WRD - Celosvětová akce
Kód UT WoS článku
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