Should I stay or should I go? Carbon leakage and ETS in an evolutionary model

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F21%3A10248165" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/21:10248165 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988321004333?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988321004333?via%3Dihub</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105561" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105561</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Should I stay or should I go? Carbon leakage and ETS in an evolutionary model

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Emissions trading is gaining increasing importance around the world as a suitable instrument to address climate change. In the absence of a global carbon market, however, unilateral carbon policies may end up causing carbon leakage effects, the more so if carbon prices are to increase in the future to achieve more ambitious emissions abatement targets. This paper intends to explore the possible delocalization effects of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) by proposing an evolutionary theoretical model in which regulated firms decide whether to stay (keep their production activities in the domestic country) or leave (move production abroad where no ETS is in place) imitating what other firms do. We investigate how this decision is affected by some key ETS design features, such as the emissions cap, the number of allowances granted for free to ETS firms, the level of a floor price for allowances. Numerical simulations show that the firms&apos; decision on whether to abate emissions or relocate abroad are more sensitive to policies that reduce the cost of green technologies than to changes in specific features of the ETS design such as the emissions cap, the floor price and the number of permits granted for free.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Should I stay or should I go? Carbon leakage and ETS in an evolutionary model

Popis výsledku anglicky

Emissions trading is gaining increasing importance around the world as a suitable instrument to address climate change. In the absence of a global carbon market, however, unilateral carbon policies may end up causing carbon leakage effects, the more so if carbon prices are to increase in the future to achieve more ambitious emissions abatement targets. This paper intends to explore the possible delocalization effects of an Emissions Trading System (ETS) by proposing an evolutionary theoretical model in which regulated firms decide whether to stay (keep their production activities in the domestic country) or leave (move production abroad where no ETS is in place) imitating what other firms do. We investigate how this decision is affected by some key ETS design features, such as the emissions cap, the number of allowances granted for free to ETS firms, the level of a floor price for allowances. Numerical simulations show that the firms&apos; decision on whether to abate emissions or relocate abroad are more sensitive to policies that reduce the cost of green technologies than to changes in specific features of the ETS design such as the emissions cap, the floor price and the number of permits granted for free.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-13951S" target="_blank" >GA18-13951S: Nové přístupy k modelování finančních časových řad pomocí soft-computingu</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Energy Economics

ISSN

0140-9883

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

103

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

November

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000711152500007

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85116719033