Experts vs. policymakers in the COVID-19 policy response

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F22%3A10250639" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/22:10250639 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726812200227X?via%3Dihub" target="_blank" >https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016726812200227X?via%3Dihub</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.031" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.031</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Experts vs. policymakers in the COVID-19 policy response

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We build an evolutionary game-theoretic model of the interaction between policymakers and experts in shaping the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Players&apos; decisions concern two alternative strategies of pandemic management: a &quot;hard&quot; approach, enforcing potentially unpopular measures such as strict confinement orders, and a &quot;soft&quot; approach, based upon voluntary and short-lived social distancing. Policymakers&apos; decisions may also rely upon expert advice. Unlike experts, policymakers are sensitive to a public consensus incentive that makes lifting restrictions as soon as possible especially desirable. This incentive may conflict with the overall goal of mitigating the effects of the pandemic, leading to a typical policy dilemma. We show that the selection of strategies may be path-dependent, as their initial distribution is a crucial driver of players&apos; choices. Contingent on cultural factors and the epidemiological conditions, steady states in which both types of players unanimously endorse the strict strategy can coexist with others where experts and policy-makers agree on the soft strategy, depending on the initial conditions. The model can also lead to attractive asymmetric equilibria where experts and policymakers endorse different strategies, or to cyclical dynamics where the shares of adoption of strategies oscillate indefinitely around a mixed strategy equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria can explain the coexistence of contrasting pandemic countermeasures observed across countries in the first wave of the outbreak. Our results suggest that cross-country differences in the COVID-19 policy response need not be the effect of poor decision making. Instead, they can endogenously result from the interplay between policymakers and experts incentives under the local social, cultural and epidemiological conditions. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Experts vs. policymakers in the COVID-19 policy response

Popis výsledku anglicky

We build an evolutionary game-theoretic model of the interaction between policymakers and experts in shaping the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Players&apos; decisions concern two alternative strategies of pandemic management: a &quot;hard&quot; approach, enforcing potentially unpopular measures such as strict confinement orders, and a &quot;soft&quot; approach, based upon voluntary and short-lived social distancing. Policymakers&apos; decisions may also rely upon expert advice. Unlike experts, policymakers are sensitive to a public consensus incentive that makes lifting restrictions as soon as possible especially desirable. This incentive may conflict with the overall goal of mitigating the effects of the pandemic, leading to a typical policy dilemma. We show that the selection of strategies may be path-dependent, as their initial distribution is a crucial driver of players&apos; choices. Contingent on cultural factors and the epidemiological conditions, steady states in which both types of players unanimously endorse the strict strategy can coexist with others where experts and policy-makers agree on the soft strategy, depending on the initial conditions. The model can also lead to attractive asymmetric equilibria where experts and policymakers endorse different strategies, or to cyclical dynamics where the shares of adoption of strategies oscillate indefinitely around a mixed strategy equilibrium. This multiplicity of equilibria can explain the coexistence of contrasting pandemic countermeasures observed across countries in the first wave of the outbreak. Our results suggest that cross-country differences in the COVID-19 policy response need not be the effect of poor decision making. Instead, they can endogenously result from the interplay between policymakers and experts incentives under the local social, cultural and epidemiological conditions. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50200 - Economics and Business

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-16701S" target="_blank" >GA20-16701S: Hybridní evoluční hry a ekonomické aplikace</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

ISSN

0167-2681

e-ISSN

1879-1751

Svazek periodika

201

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

22-39

Kód UT WoS článku

000853850500002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85134845821