Malaysia, the Philippines, and China: The Belt and Road Initiative as a Failed Driver for Constructive Relations

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F23%3A73621225" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/23:73621225 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003377214-14" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003377214-14</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003377214-14" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003377214-14</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Malaysia, the Philippines, and China: The Belt and Road Initiative as a Failed Driver for Constructive Relations

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The Southeast Asian nations established diplomatic relations with China at different times: while Malaysia and the Philippines were, despite their staunch anti-communist stance, frontrunners in 1974 and 1975, respectively, Singapore followed only in 1990. Indonesia resumed diplomatic relations in the same year. However, since the end of the Cold War, all Southeast Asian countries as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deepened their bonds in politics, economics, culture, science, education, people-to-people contacts, and even traditional and non-traditional security matters. This contribution argues that the Southeast Asian nations apply a hedging strategy toward China, i.e., they aim to insure themselves against negative impacts stemming from China’s behavior. While they strongly engage with China in politics, diplomacy, and economics to reap benefits from Beijing’s rise, they cooperate closely with the US and Japan in the security domain to counter-balance China’s growing might.After providing a brief analysis of the Sino–Southeast Asian relations from the 1990s to 2013, this contribution will focus on Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), questioning whether it can become the main framework for China’s relations with the Southeast Asian nations. For this, this study will demonstrate that the BRI has already facilitated closer cooperation in trade, economics, infrastructure development, and people-to-people contacts. The focus rests on China’s relations with Malaysia and the Philippines. As in both countries, certain large-scale BRI projects are contested, both in Malaysia and the Philippines one or two projects will be examined in more detail to ascertain their socioeconomic impact.Trust-building is a key objective of the BRI. Therefore, apart from examining the tangible results of the BRI-led cooperation, the perceptions of the Malaysian and Philippine citizens of China will be ascertained utilizing opinion polls. It will be asked how the views of China have changed since the launch of the BRI in 2013 and whether public perceptions affect the national policies toward Beijing. Notably, the Philippines’ citizens are traditionally critical of China, especially regarding its assertive behavior in the South China Sea. Moreover, as security (“New Asian Security Concept”) is an important dimension of the BRI, the respective collaboration will be addressed, with a focus on maritime security in the South China Sea. It will be discussed whether the BRI-promoted cooperation is likely to impact in a positive manner the resolution or at least the management of the territorial disputes.Overall, this contribution will provide a state-of-the-art analysis of China’s comprehensive relations with Malaysia and the Philippines under the BRI frame. It will identify areas in which further cooperation is required but also address potential negative aspects of the collaboration, notably the danger of falling into a debt trap and becoming economically overdependent on China.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Malaysia, the Philippines, and China: The Belt and Road Initiative as a Failed Driver for Constructive Relations

Popis výsledku anglicky

The Southeast Asian nations established diplomatic relations with China at different times: while Malaysia and the Philippines were, despite their staunch anti-communist stance, frontrunners in 1974 and 1975, respectively, Singapore followed only in 1990. Indonesia resumed diplomatic relations in the same year. However, since the end of the Cold War, all Southeast Asian countries as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deepened their bonds in politics, economics, culture, science, education, people-to-people contacts, and even traditional and non-traditional security matters. This contribution argues that the Southeast Asian nations apply a hedging strategy toward China, i.e., they aim to insure themselves against negative impacts stemming from China’s behavior. While they strongly engage with China in politics, diplomacy, and economics to reap benefits from Beijing’s rise, they cooperate closely with the US and Japan in the security domain to counter-balance China’s growing might.After providing a brief analysis of the Sino–Southeast Asian relations from the 1990s to 2013, this contribution will focus on Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), questioning whether it can become the main framework for China’s relations with the Southeast Asian nations. For this, this study will demonstrate that the BRI has already facilitated closer cooperation in trade, economics, infrastructure development, and people-to-people contacts. The focus rests on China’s relations with Malaysia and the Philippines. As in both countries, certain large-scale BRI projects are contested, both in Malaysia and the Philippines one or two projects will be examined in more detail to ascertain their socioeconomic impact.Trust-building is a key objective of the BRI. Therefore, apart from examining the tangible results of the BRI-led cooperation, the perceptions of the Malaysian and Philippine citizens of China will be ascertained utilizing opinion polls. It will be asked how the views of China have changed since the launch of the BRI in 2013 and whether public perceptions affect the national policies toward Beijing. Notably, the Philippines’ citizens are traditionally critical of China, especially regarding its assertive behavior in the South China Sea. Moreover, as security (“New Asian Security Concept”) is an important dimension of the BRI, the respective collaboration will be addressed, with a focus on maritime security in the South China Sea. It will be discussed whether the BRI-promoted cooperation is likely to impact in a positive manner the resolution or at least the management of the territorial disputes.Overall, this contribution will provide a state-of-the-art analysis of China’s comprehensive relations with Malaysia and the Philippines under the BRI frame. It will identify areas in which further cooperation is required but also address potential negative aspects of the collaboration, notably the danger of falling into a debt trap and becoming economically overdependent on China.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Peaceful Management of Maritime Disputes

ISBN

978-1-03-241613-7

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

219-236

Počet stran knihy

276

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

Abingdon

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—