China-Myanmar Relations After the 1 February Military Coup

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F23%3A73621261" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/23:73621261 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/after-coup" target="_blank" >https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/after-coup</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/AC.2023.06" target="_blank" >10.22459/AC.2023.06</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

China-Myanmar Relations After the 1 February Military Coup

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Following Myanmar’s 1 February military coup, Beijing remained more cautious than other countries in its response. Protesters accused China of supporting the Myanmar generals and torched Chinese factories and boycotted Chinese products. However, did China actually back the Myanmar military? It would be too simplistic to assume that China favoured a return to military rule in Myanmar. Myanmar, with its many Belt and Road Initiative projects, is important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean; therefore, choosing the appropriate strategy was crucial for a continued relationship. Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup did not favour the military; yet, despite having a reasonable relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi, it did not favour the protest movement either. However, as time has passed, China has edged increasingly closer to recognising the military regime, approving funds for infrastructure projects and donating COVID-19 vaccines. Why has this shift occurred? This chapter argues that, although initially logical and beneficial, appearing neutral ultimately became costly to China’s strategic interests as time passed and that, as a consequence, China began moving to closer cooperation with the military.

Název v anglickém jazyce

China-Myanmar Relations After the 1 February Military Coup

Popis výsledku anglicky

Following Myanmar’s 1 February military coup, Beijing remained more cautious than other countries in its response. Protesters accused China of supporting the Myanmar generals and torched Chinese factories and boycotted Chinese products. However, did China actually back the Myanmar military? It would be too simplistic to assume that China favoured a return to military rule in Myanmar. Myanmar, with its many Belt and Road Initiative projects, is important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean; therefore, choosing the appropriate strategy was crucial for a continued relationship. Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup did not favour the military; yet, despite having a reasonable relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi, it did not favour the protest movement either. However, as time has passed, China has edged increasingly closer to recognising the military regime, approving funds for infrastructure projects and donating COVID-19 vaccines. Why has this shift occurred? This chapter argues that, although initially logical and beneficial, appearing neutral ultimately became costly to China’s strategic interests as time passed and that, as a consequence, China began moving to closer cooperation with the military.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

O - Projekt operacniho programu

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

After the Coup: Myanmar&apos;s political and humanitarian crisis

ISBN

978-1-76046-613-8

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

119-135

Počet stran knihy

348

Název nakladatele

ANU Press

Místo vydání

Canberra

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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