Vis-à-Vis:Signification does not necessitate backward causation

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F25%3A73633544" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/25:73633544 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/26387" target="_blank" >https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/26387</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2025.53.3-4.05" target="_blank" >10.12697/SSS.2025.53.3-4.05</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Vis-à-Vis:Signification does not necessitate backward causation

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The following paper examines the metaphysics of signification in John Deely’s work and presents two arguments:(1) that Deely’s metaphysics sanctions backward causation in signification, and(2) that there may be a more parsimonious view that can be defended.The paper briefly examines the background of Peirce’s metaphysics and then addresses his specific notion of semiotic causality, including the relevance of the vis a prospecto in his work. I will argue, however, that in accounting for signification, appealing to past states changed by future states can only be done in a weak, epistemological manner, as opposed to what I see as a modal view in Deely.As Deely’s metaphysics has profoundly influenced the philosophical discourse of current semiotics, it is important to assess the ontological commitments required for signification to take place. His account of semiotic causality as a teleological phenomenon may offer a powerful explanatory framework for how signification occurs (and with it, how signs come to be), but its consequences may result in counterintuitive ways of thinking about meaning-making.I offer a positive deflationary account of how to preserve a weaker sense of semiotic causality in order to avoid the risks posed by the vis a prospecto in Deely’s proposal.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Vis-à-Vis:Signification does not necessitate backward causation

Popis výsledku anglicky

The following paper examines the metaphysics of signification in John Deely’s work and presents two arguments:(1) that Deely’s metaphysics sanctions backward causation in signification, and(2) that there may be a more parsimonious view that can be defended.The paper briefly examines the background of Peirce’s metaphysics and then addresses his specific notion of semiotic causality, including the relevance of the vis a prospecto in his work. I will argue, however, that in accounting for signification, appealing to past states changed by future states can only be done in a weak, epistemological manner, as opposed to what I see as a modal view in Deely.As Deely’s metaphysics has profoundly influenced the philosophical discourse of current semiotics, it is important to assess the ontological commitments required for signification to take place. His account of semiotic causality as a teleological phenomenon may offer a powerful explanatory framework for how signification occurs (and with it, how signs come to be), but its consequences may result in counterintuitive ways of thinking about meaning-making.I offer a positive deflationary account of how to preserve a weaker sense of semiotic causality in order to avoid the risks posed by the vis a prospecto in Deely’s proposal.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Sign Systems Studies

ISSN

1406-4243

e-ISSN

1736-7409

Svazek periodika

2025

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

53(3/4)

Stát vydavatele periodika

EE - Estonská republika

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

398-415

Kód UT WoS článku

001667475800005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105028880553