Agent-Principal Dilemma and the EU Chemical Management

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15220%2F18%3A73587270" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15220/18:73587270 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://obd.upol.cz/id_publ/333167156" target="_blank" >https://obd.upol.cz/id_publ/333167156</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bjes-2018-0009" target="_blank" >10.1515/bjes-2018-0009</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Agent-Principal Dilemma and the EU Chemical Management

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In 2007, the EU adopted the most comprehensive chemical regulation in the world. The so-called REACH requires all chemical producers and importers to register and evaluate their chemical products and, when necessary, replace them with safer alternatives. For the administration of REACH, a new European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) was established. Establishment of this specialized body under the close supervision of the European Commission created in many ways an untraditional relationship which differs from the agent–principal model. The main aim of this article is to explore the specific nature of the agent–principal relationship between the ECHA and the European Commission in the areas of delegation, information asymmetry, motivation and control structures and emphasize how specific measures may limit the negative outcomes of the agent–principal dilemma.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Agent-Principal Dilemma and the EU Chemical Management

Popis výsledku anglicky

In 2007, the EU adopted the most comprehensive chemical regulation in the world. The so-called REACH requires all chemical producers and importers to register and evaluate their chemical products and, when necessary, replace them with safer alternatives. For the administration of REACH, a new European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) was established. Establishment of this specialized body under the close supervision of the European Commission created in many ways an untraditional relationship which differs from the agent–principal model. The main aim of this article is to explore the specific nature of the agent–principal relationship between the ECHA and the European Commission in the areas of delegation, information asymmetry, motivation and control structures and emphasize how specific measures may limit the negative outcomes of the agent–principal dilemma.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50602 - Public administration

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

BALTIC JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

ISSN

2228-0588

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

8

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

EE - Estonská republika

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

154-175

Kód UT WoS článku

000435022600008

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85048753184